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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the monitoring effect from institutional ownership on bidder Chief 
Executive Officer (hereafter CEO) compensation in mergers and acquisitions (hereafter M&A) 
as well as the shift in compensation structure. While it is well-established in the literature that 
bidder CEO compensation soars significantly after conducting such transactions, the sources of 
the growth are left unclear. One major argument, the traditional theory, proposes that the growth 
derives from additional wealth created to shareholders in M&A, because according to the nature 
of compensation contract, CEOs’ interests are effectively aligned with shareholders’ benefits. On 
the other hand, scholars of managerial power theory argue that managerial power is stronger than 
shareholders’ oversight, so managers use M&A as a cover to expropriate wealth from 
shareholders. Whether the traditional theory or the managerial power theory dominates depends 
on the presence of optimal contract and the effectiveness of corporate governance. Institutional 
owners have more motivation and resources to restrict managerial behaviour than diffused 
owners. Thus, the change in CEO compensation following M&A and the driving factors behind 
the change could be different in firms with different types of ownership.  
After examining the 268 merger events from 266 US public non-family bidding firms from 
2001 to 2005, this study finds that the magnitude of increase in CEO cash-based compensation is 
significantly alleviated in the presence of large institutional shareholders, and that the increase 
seems to be positively related to good short-term performance rather than managerial power. 
However, the concentrated institutional ownership does not seem to affect CEO equity-based 
compensation or the change in compensation structure. Besides, we do not find any significant 
relation between firm long-term post-acquisition performance and the market reaction to the 
announcement of M&A. Thus, we propose that without a reliable indication from short-term 
performance, large institutional shareholders could have problems in understanding the potential 
impact of M&A and they might adjust CEO equity-based compensation in a serial process after 
M&A.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The separation of residual claims of free cash flow and decision making in corporations 
induces the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (Berle & Means, 1932; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). Executive compensation is widely used as a governance 
device to motivate managers to act in the best interest of shareholders by tying managers’ wealth 
to their performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1999). The 
design of optimal compensation contract and the effectiveness in mitigating agency problem 
have been discussed in scores of recent studies. According to the traditional theory1such as 
addressed in the study of Core, Guay, and Larket (2003) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003), 
management performance is directly observable or indirectly measurable, and the boards of 
directors are well-advised in their job to make sure the bargaining for compensation between 
managers and shareholders is optimal. However, numerous empirical studies which focus on the 
linkage between top managers’ compensation and firm performance fail to find a strongly 
positive relation between performance and compensation (Antle & Smith, 1986; Jensen & 
Murhpy, 1990, Magnan, St Onge, & Thome, 1995; Jeppson, Smith & Stone, 2009). Their 
findings cast doubt on the relevance of the traditional theory. The managerial power theory 
argues that the boards of directors lose their independence and accountability in the face of being 
blackmailed or packed by management, thus mangers take advantage of their power to extract 
rents (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Lane, Cannella, & Lubatkin, 1998; Crystal, 1991; Core 
et al., 2003; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003).  
M&A is a firm’s most significant capital expenditure, which usually takes the longest time to 
finish and results in the greatest change in terms of firm’s scale and scope. Since the level of 
CEO compensation increases with firm size (Roberts, 1956; Simon, 1957; McGuire, Chiu, & 
Elbing, 1962; Rosen, 1982; Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, & Hinkin, 1987; Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 
1988; Murphy, 1999), the amplified change in CEO compensation provide an excellent ground  
to test the above two contradictory theories. Many studies focus on the relation between post-
acquisition performance and top managers’ compensation in bidder firms (Kroll, Simmons, & 
Wright, 1990; Williams, Michael, & Waller, 2008), but the results are subject to the choices of 
time periods, horizons, measurements, and techniques (Schoenberg, 2006; Tuch & O’Sullivan, 
2007; Dutta & Jog, 2009). No matter whether the pay-for-performance sensitivity is found to be 
                                                             
1
 Traditional theory is also named interest alignment theory or optimal contract theory.  
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positive or negative, it is hard to tell the role of managerial power in determining CEO 
compensation in M&A. As far as we know, only three papers directly examine the two 
hypotheses in M&A. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that the market reacts negatively on 
average to acquisition announcements but still 88% of US bidding CEOs receive considerable 
bonuses, which arise from CEOs’ control power. Thus, they make the conclusion that CEO 
compensation can hardly align the management and shareholders’ interest. Instead, CEO 
compensation aggravates the agency costs by providing CEO with an opportunity to expropriate 
wealth from shareholders. Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006) claim that CEO salary and bonus in 
M&A are more affected by managerial power in the US2 firms than in the UK firms. Bugeja, 
Rosa, Duong, and Izan (2012) extend the investigation to Australia firms and propose that 
Australian managers are paid for their skills and performance in M&A. 
Regardless of the varying time periods and different markets employed in the literature, the 
basis that traditional theory and managerial power theory build on is the effectiveness of internal 
governance from shareholders. Since ownership structure is one of most important internal 
monitoring forces that could prevent managers from expropriating wealth from shareholders, 
inconsistent conclusions in the literature of the driving factors behind the growth of CEO 
compensation in M&A could be explained by the variety of ownership structure. For example, 
Ben-Amar and André (2006) find family controlled firms and the presence of outside 
blockholders increase bidders’ performance. Since institutional ownership is prevalent in public 
companies, it is worthwhile to take into account of the interacted effects of large institutional 
shareholders and managerial power on compensation setting. This thesis investigates the changes 
in bidder executive compensation following M&A by addressing the monitoring role played by 
large institutional shareholders. In widely held companies, a shareholder with small ownership 
does not have sufficient motivation to monitor managers since the proportional benefits from 
firm’s increased value after monitoring do not outweigh the total costs that the shareholder has to 
bear alone (Grossman & Hart, 1980). On the other hand, a large shareholder, who owns a 
dominant number of shares, is willing to put efforts in improving firm performance (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) and also has better resources to exercise governance roles 
and protect investors’ benefits (Parthiban, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998; Almazan, Hartzell, & 
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 Their sample includes 73 UK bidding firms and 27 hand-collected US bidding firms which target UK firms. 
Therefore, their sample is different from the sample of Grinstein and Hribar (2004).  
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Starks, 2005). However, the effectiveness of institutional large shareholder’s oversight is 
constrained by the monitoring costs and the institution’s assets (Almazan et al., 2005), the 
liquidation cost of current securities and reinvestment cost in alternative shares (Tannous, Yang, 
& Jiang, 2013), the significance of the institution’s holding in a firm (Khan, Dharwadkar, & 
Brandes, 2005), the ratio of the institution’s investment to its overall wealth (Lori & Schneider, 
2002), and its relationship with the firm’s management (Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1988). We 
aim to give answers to whether institutional ownership can explain the variance in the level of 
CEO compensation following M&A and whether the changes and differences can be attributed to 
the alignment of principals’ and agents’ interests or to the expropriation of benefits from 
shareholders via managerial power in different ownership. 
Another contribution of our study is the investigation of how CEO compensation structure 
changes in M&A and what drives these changes. Specifically, we examine the traditional theory 
and the managerial power theory by looking at large institutional shareholders’ and CEOs’ 
selections of the type of compensation. Under rigorous scrutiny and effective governance, CEO 
should be compensated through a large portion of long-term incentive payments, such as options 
and stocks, to lengthen managerial horizon (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Hall & Liebman, 1998; 
Murphy, 1999; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Raman, 2001). However, with the power and the 
freedom of self-selection, we propose that CEOs prefer cash if they know ahead that firm value 
will drop, and they favor equity in the opposite condition because their wealth will go up with 
the increased firm value after M&A. 
The third contribution is the incorporation of the impact of acquisitions on bidders’ long-term 
performance and the matching of the impact with different types of CEO compensation. Market 
reactions to M&A announcement could be biased as limited information is revealed during a 
short period of time, and firms’ actual benefits from M&A transactions could deviate from 
announcement day abnormal returns (Hitt, Harrison, Ireland, & Best, 1998). Therefore, we 
include the firm long-term performance in our analysis to explore the determinants of CEO 
compensation in M&A and to test the power of prediction from firm short-term performance. 
We study 268 M&As from US public non-family companies3 which conduct and complete 
                                                             
3 Agency problems, corporate governance, and operating horizons are different between family firms and non-family 
firms (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Shim & Okamuro, 2011). To exclude the mixed impact of 
family ownership and only test institutional ownership, our sample excludes the family firms identified by the study  
of Anderson and Reeb (2004). 
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merger and acquisition transactions during the period from 2001 to 2005. Different from the 
consensus in the literature that CEO compensation jumps significantly through M&A, we find 
that, before controlling for firm performance, the magnitude and the direction of the changes are 
neither uniform nor consistent over time. Before 2001, surges in the stock option payments, 
boom of the stock market, and big wave of M&A accelerate both cash and equity payments to 
executives. After 2001, CEO cash compensation still increases after M&A, but equity 
compensation, especially option grants, decreases substantially, resulting in lower overall 
compensation. Nevertheless, bidder CEOs still receive much higher compensation, in terms of 
cash and equity, than the organic group, which does not engage in M&A during the same period. 
Through our tests, management expropriation of cash in M&A is greatly mitigated by large 
institutional shareholders. Large institutional shareholders not only reduce the level of increases 
in cash but also link CEO cash compensation to firm short-term performance and cut the 
increases from managerial power. However, large institutional shareholders do not show any 
oversight over CEO equity compensation or over the shift of compensation structure. Since our 
results suggest that market reaction to the announcement of M&A is not a good indication of the 
firm long-term performance, we conjecture that large institutional shareholders have no basis to 
evaluate management performance in M&A and adjust CEO equity compensation in the 
completion year. Instead, they may set CEO equity compensation gradually in serial process.  
The reminder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 comprehensively reviews the 
literature of CEO compensation, M&A, ownership structure, and firm performance. Chapter 3 
discusses the development of our theoretical hypotheses. Data selection and variable construction 
are presented in Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 summarizes the properties of our data and 
demonstrates the regression tests. Chapter 6 concludes this study and makes suggestions for 
future resreach. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Recent publications discuss the increases in CEO compensation through M&As. They 
compare the change in a group of companies that experience M&A transactions with the change 
in a comparable group that does not experience M&As. Some studies conclude that the change in 
compensation is necessary to maintain the optional compensation contracts while others propose 
that M&A activities are good occasions for CEO to extract rents beyond what might be justified 
by optional compensation. In this chapter, we review the literatures regarding CEO 
compensation, institutional ownership, and M&A. The purpose is to highlight the findings of the 
existing literature and point out how our analysis will complement the literature. 
 
2.1 CEO Compensation, Agency Problem, and Corporate Governance 
In large public corporations, the ownership and control are separated. Investors devote funds 
to projects and enjoy the residual claims of cash flow as well as bear the related risks. Managers, 
on one hand, provide professional knowledge and skills, make decisions in operating and 
managing the assets, and, in return, receive a certain amount of payment according to the 
compensation contract. As a self-interest driven person, the manager has less motivation to put 
shareholders’ interest first and this is known as an agency problem. The difference between the 
maximum value that can be generated to shareholders and the value that is actually generated is 
known as agency costs. In order to mitigate the agency problem, CEO compensation should be 
designed to reward for professional knowledge and management skills as well as serve as a 
mechanism to inspire management to pursue shareholders’ interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980). An optimal compensation contract should be written by internal corporate 
governors who understand management performance and also are independent from management 
(Murphy, 1999). The board of directors is one such mechanism to protect shareholders’ interests: 
the board of directors control firms’ major policies, including executive compensation, via voting 
rights (Fama & Jensen, 1983a, Fama & Jensen, 1983b). The board is comprised of insiders, who 
have access to inside information, and outsiders, who are supposed to monitor management for 
shareholders’ best interest.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) report that many outside board members are nominated by 
managers, thus they are likely to cater to managements’ demands when confronted with threat of 
dismissal. In addition, directors who are also executives in other firms are less likely to take 
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active roles, as they either experience the same situation and thus feel like they are in the same 
boat or they are too busy with their own management affairs and thus have no time to keep an 
eye on other CEOs. Meanwhile, managers pack inside board members via greenmail to get their 
approval of managerial decisions, so inside board members turn a blind eye to management 
behaviour which benefits CEOs themselves (Kosnik, 1987). Besides, the directors usually own a 
small portion of shares, which do not provide sufficient motivation to protect shareholders’ 
interests (Baker et al., 1988; Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). 
 
2.2 CEO Compensation and M&A 
M&A is a significant investment decision, in terms of the scale and the complexity of the 
transaction (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Dutta & Jog, 2009), and it causes a big increase in bidder 
CEO compensation. Conyon and Gregg (1994) compare the increases in CEO compensation 
following M&As with the increases observed in a peer group that do not experience acquisition 
activities. They propose the increases in compensation are much higher from conducting M&A 
than through internal growth. Girma Thompson, and Wrightt (2006) use a dynamic model to 
examine the impact of M&A on CEO compensation and confirm that the rapid growth also exists 
in UK bidding firms.  
 
2.2.1 Traditional Theory of CEO Compensation 
According to the traditional view of compensation design, a CEO is paid for creating benefits 
to shareholders by using professional management skills based on an optimal contract. Girma et 
al. (2006) state “This posits that in an environment of incomplete monitoring, the (risk-neutral) 
shareholder-principals would devise a payment mechanism to motivate the (risk-averse) 
executive’s pursuit of shareholder value” ( p322-323). Core et al. (2003) propose that, although 
the perfect compensation contract is expensive, firms are expected, on average, to make 
sufficient efforts to modify and complement the optimal contracts.  
In reality, information is costly for outsiders to access and they may find it hard to fully 
understand management investment decisions, especially M&A. Theoretically, payments should 
only be awarded to managers for value accrued to shareholders; however, the benefits from 
M&As could show up over several years in the future. To control for good performance, 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004), Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006), and Bugeja et al. (2012) also 
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employ measures of the manager’s efforts and devotion in M&A. Thus, the jump in CEO 
compensation after M&As may be attributed to management’s excellent performance and to their 
efforts to increase a firm’s prospective growth. 
 
2.2.2 Managerial Power Theory of CEO Compensation 
Following the managerial power framework, the expensive transaction costs (information 
costs, contracting costs and so on) (Core et al., 2003) and insufficient market monitoring 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2003) could prevent firms from setting and continuously revising optimal 
contracts. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) review few significant papers and state that “[e]xecutive 
compensation is viewed not only as a potential instrument for addressing the agency problem but 
also as part of the agency problem itself”(p72) .  
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find CEOs are paid for M&A regardless of profitability. Hence, the 
increased compensation could be a motivation to engage in M&A (Dorata & Petra, 2008). 
Empirical evidence also suggest that CEOs conduct M&As because of available free cash and 
desire for empire building (Jensen, 1986), risk diversification (Amihud & Lev,1981), and pursuit 
of power, social status, and other non-pecuniary benefits (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990). 
Mueller (1969) and Jensen (1986) argue that M&As offer managers a good excuse to bargain 
more compensation with shareholders for enlarged firm size. Harford and Li (2007) indicate that 
compensation contracts, though being designed to mitigate the conflict of interest, are used by 
managers to make up for their personal wealth loss in M&A in bad performance or to boost their 
wealth in good performance in M&A.  
 
2.2.3 Empirical Studies 
Despite different explanations, many financial experts first look into the performance and cast 
doubt on the fairness and rationale of compensation leaps in M&A. Acquiring shareholders 
systematically suffer as a result of M&A. Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz (2003) propose that the market reacts negatively to a bidding firm’s announcement of 
acquisition. Loughran and Vijh (1997) prove that a firm's market value declines for several years 
after M&A. However, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) test the combined value of bidders and 
targets and conclude that the stock market has a positive expectation of M&A and that the 
merged firms raise their productivities after M&A. However, Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003) 
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extend the study of Healy et al (1992) to a 10-year window, 5-year before and 5-year after M&A 
transactions. They document that firm long-term performance in the full sample, measured as 
industry-adjusted cash flow returns on market value of assets of pooled companies, deteriorates 
after acquisitions. However, Abhyankar, Keng-Yu, and Zhao (2005) develop a stochastic 
dominance method to test the bidders’ performance and they conclude that the bidders do not 
underperform in M&A. 
Secondly, scholars also compare the compensation growth and firm performance. Girma et al. 
(2006) show that CEO compensation in the UK after mergers is not strongly associated with firm 
performance but with firm size, which is consistent with Baker et al (1988), and Murphy's (1999) 
result. On the other hand, Girma et al. (2006) report that shareholders’ monitoring effects do not 
totally vanish because the increases in executive compensation in firms with “wealth-reducing” 
deals are significantly lower than the increases in a “wealth-increasing”  group. Moreover, 
Harford and Li (2007) show that CEO overall wealth is associated with firm negative stock 
performance but not with positive performance in US firms. Tian and Yang (2011) examine 
Austrilia firms and they find the managers with increased bonus are more likely to takeover 
another firm, which do not increase firm risks. Overall, the conclusions are influenced by various 
time periods, horizons, measurements, techniques, and other characteristics (Schoenberg, 2006; 
Tuch & O’Sullivan, 2007; Dutta & Jog, 2009).  
 
2.2.4 Size Effect 
Many empirical studies report a robust association between the level of CEO compensation 
and firm size (Roberts, 1956; McGuire et al., 1962; Rosen, 1982; Baker et al., 1988; Murphy, 
1999). Since firm size is greatly increased in M&A, top managers in acquiring firms are 
rewarded for enlarged capitalization (Dorata & Petra, 2008). 
The size effect could be explained by the empire building theory whereby the greater the 
magnitude of the organization under managers’ control, the more managerial power they have to 
extract rents from weakly governed firms (Simon, 1957). From an economic determinant point 
of view, superb management skills and experiences are highly demanded in larger firms, so 
CEOs can ask for higher payments (Becker, 1964; Rosen, 1982). Moreover, Simon (1957),  and 
Gomez-Mejia et al (1987) also mention the tournament theory (or also called the hierarchy 
theory), which states that getting a higher position is like a competition, in which the contestants 
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in a higher level have more outstanding skills and they can hardly be replaced by the contestants 
in a lower level. Large firms have more divisions and subsidiaries (Child 1973), and CEOs in 
large firms are akin to winners in a tournament race who beat more contestants, and thus they 
should have the biggest prize (Girma et al., 2006). Cordeiro and Veliyath (2003) also point out 
that as the business complexity increases in larger companies, CEOs deserve higher 
compensation for devoting more time and efforts on operations and management. As a result, it 
is hard to categorize the size effect into the traditional theory or the managerial power theory. 
 
2.3 CEO Compensation and Ownership Structure 
2.3.1 Diffused Ownership Verses Concentrated Ownership 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim that firms with diffused ownership suffer more from 
agency costs than those with concentrated ownership. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) propose two 
forces that can impair CEO managerial power: a strong and independent board and a large 
institutional ownership. To prevent managers from using shareholders’ money to maximize 
managerial wealth, shareholders should set up monitoring devices, but those devices are costly to 
initiate in practice. While the benefits will be shared among all shareholders, the costs will only 
be borne by the atomistic shareholder who conducts the monitoring. Thus, because no one has 
large shares to enjoy bigger benefits from monitoring, shareholders in widely held companies 
would not watch management activity (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985).  
Berle and Means (1932) argue that, as the owners of public corporations do not have direct 
controlling rights over firm operating decisions or expenditure investments, dispersed 
shareholders are less influential over management and are less responsible for the firms’ potential 
development. Demsetz (1983) demonstrates that diffused ownership in widely held companies 
weakens shareholders’ disciplinary power over management. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) imply 
that small shareholders in concentrated ownership would not play a monitoring role.  
However, the appropriateness of dominant shareholders’ monitoring is also challenged by 
Lane et al. (1998). They doubt large shareholders’ capability of effectively assessing 
management performance by showing that the holdings of inside information are not necessarily 
proportional to the holdings of controlling rights. They state that most block shareholders have 
less engagement in operating strategy decision making and they rely on financial criteria, which 
is the only available and intuitive information to use. However, the financial data is not 
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necessarily consistent with firm value. It may take several years to show up the potential benefits 
of investment projects; meanwhile, managers can manipulate accounting measures to fake good 
performance. Therefore, Lane et al. (1998) claim that concentrated ownership enhances the 
monitoring but can also lead to evaluation bias of management plans and behaviour. Eventually, 
their tests support their conjecture that decision making over M&A or firm performance cannot 
be improved by intense monitoring from block holders. Besides, when little protection is offered 
to mininor shareholders, dominant shareholders would use their significant position to extract 
private profit to take advantages of small shareholders (Fama & Jensen 1983a, Fama & Jensen, 
1983b) or aim to reduce their high risk exposure to their firms.  
Recent studies have shown that managerial rent extraction behaviour is eliminated in the 
presence of concentrated ownership. Gomez-Mejia et al. (1987) construct various accounting and 
financial performance measures in a cross-sectional study of the size-ownership rewards, and 
they conclude that large shareholders with more than 5% of stakes pay executives for their work 
rather than for firm size. Riahi-Belkaoui and Pavlik (1993) decompose the associations between 
ownership structures and CEO compensation, and they argue that shareholders with a major 
proportion of stocks have a higher tendency to remunerate CEO with equity-based payments, 
which motivate executives to act in the owners’ best interest. Besides, they propose concentrated 
ownership is a negative function of over-diversification, CEO over-payment, and poor 
performance resulting from insufficient management capabilities through M&A. Schultz, Tian, 
and Twite (2013) find the concentration of blockholding enhance the aligning of the managers’ 
and shareholders’ interest from long-term compensation packages. 
 
2.3.2 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership has grown significantly in recent years, and several studies have 
confirmed the important role of institutional ownership. Kosnik (1987) shows that institutional 
ownership enhances board independence. Parthiban et al. (1998) confirm that institutions have a 
tendency to exercise governance role. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a positive association 
between institutional ownership and firm value, proxied by Tobin’s Q. Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
show that concentrated institutional ownership, measured by the top five largest institutional 
holdings and the Herfindahl index, contributes to a lower level of CEO salary and total 
compensation but boosts the incentive pay and total pay sensitivity. 
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Although a high level of institutional ownership is reported to restrict the amount of executive 
compensation and improves the pay-for-performance sensitivity on average, the effectiveness of 
monitoring from different institutions is contingent on their resources and the costs they are 
exposed to, such as the “the liquidity of their portfolios”, “fiduciary duties”, “their potential 
business relations with the firms”, and “the free rider problems”(Almazan et al., 2005). The 
authors categorize institutional shareholders into two groups - the potentially active or passive 
investors according to the institutions’ analysis and evaluation skills, training, and willingness to 
monitor, and they conclude that active institutional investors are more effective in controlling 
CEO payment, as they are exposed to less monitoring cost.  
Compared with family firms, institutions are less emotional attached to their firms and they 
can easily switch from current investment to alternative ones which have less monitoring 
requirements and better returns. As a result, the existence of institutional investors does not 
improve the firms’ profitability with certainty. Tannous et al. (2013) examine the monitoring role 
of family and institutional large shareholders in Canadian firms, and they find the institutional 
ownership does not improve pay-for-performance in either bonus or equity compensation. They 
categorize the reasons of inefficiency into that only significant institutional shareholders would 
oversee managers and that those dominant institutional shareholders may take their ownership 
advantage to expropriate wealth from small shareholders rather than focus on monitoring 
mangers. 
 
2.4 Executive Compensation Components 
CEO total compensation is composed of salary, bonus, restricted stock, stock option, and other 
payments. While cash-based compensation rewards managers’ work according to the accounting 
measures in a short term, equity-based compensation forces mangers to enlarge their horizons 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Cordeiro & Veliyath, 2003). Jensen & Murphy (1990) disclose that 
inside stock ownership provides a strong incentive for CEOs to act in the shareholders’ best 
interests. Hall and Liebman (1998) find that increasing CEOs’ stock and option payments offers 
desirable incentives for managers to maximize shareholders’ wealth. Ang and Core (2000) also 
prove that a manager’s shareholdings reduce agency costs. To extend the research of Ang and 
Core (2000), Singh and Davidson (2003) decompose the effects of managerial ownership and 
find that a higher management equity holding leads to a higher utilization of assets but does not 
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lower excess spending. Tian and Twite (2011) prove that managers’ equity compensation 
increases firms’ productivity. Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003) verify that the firm which 
compensates its top managers with long-term performance incentive plans and takes over small 
firms outperforms a comparable group of peers. Harford and Li (2007) document dozens of 
empirical results which show that management inside ownership forces managers to act on a 
firm's long term development. On the other hand, because bonus payments only reward for good 
performance but cannot punish bad performance, Tian and Yang (2011) propose the bonus 
payments cannot solve agency problems. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) propose that acquiring managers with equity-based payments limit 
their expropriation activities from shareholders. Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) and Datta et al. 
(2001) claim that increasing management ownership before takeovers encourages value-
enhancing activities. Williams et al. (2008) claim that stock-based compensation encourages 
managers to take on high-risk and high-profit projects.  
 
2.4.1 Equity-based Payment and Firm Long-term Post-acquisition Performance 
The literature vastly reports a positive relation between CEO equity-based payments and firm 
long-run performance after M&A. The value of managerial equity holding depends on firm’s 
market value, which links the manager’s interest with that of the shareholders (Murphy, 1999). 
Before taking advantage of shareholders, the manager must consider the trade-off between 
private utilities and the costs to equity holdings. Kroll et al. (1990) propose: Salary and bonus 
awards, accordingly, simply compensate for the CEO's human capital and have little to do with 
performance. In other words, because CEOs are very often given stock options in the firms, they 
have a vested interest in their firms' performances (p351). Therefore, equity-based payments 
motivate bidder managers to acquire firms with potential growth while cash-based payments 
drive managers to pursue short-term benefits (Tehranian, Travlos, & Waegelein, 1987). Fung, Jo, 
and Tsai (2009) address this argument by showing that the absence of long-term incentive 
compensation plans negatively affects firm value following acquisitions.  
Gao (2010) explains the impact of management incentive compensation by testing the 
temporary market reaction to acquiring announcement and firms’ value in the long-run following 
acquisition in a sample of 2,894 acquiring deals in the US from January 1993 to December 2004. 
The author finds that CEOs with restricted stock and option grants have longer managerial 
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horizons. Although the long horizons lead acquiring firms to experience lower announcement 
abnormal returns within 3-day window, those firms’ market value in a long term, measured by 
three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns following acquisition, is positive and high.  
Built on the theory of equity issuance and catering, Gao (2010) proposes that managerial 
horizons impact M&A activities via the methods of payment and acquiring firms’ value is also 
affected in both short and long terms. With long-term performance incentive plans, top managers 
tend to finance acquisition transactions with over-priced stocks, which damages firms’ abnormal 
returns but enhances firms’ market value in the long-run. On the other hand, the author also 
argues that, managers without equity-based payments are likely to avoid using overpriced stocks 
to cater to the market in the short-term. They could acquire targets with negative NPV as long as 
the market value increases in the short-term.  
Oler and Waegelein (2011) find that long-term compensation plans reduce the probability of 
engaging in wealth-destroying investments. With a sample of 1,683 acquisitions from 1972 to 
2003, they also suggest that long-term performance compensation plans improve a firm’s 
fundamental and market performance, measured by the 2-year post-acquisition buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns. They state that “Long-term performance plans lengthen a manager’s decision-
making horizon because the performance plan compensation is deferred until the end of the 
award period and forfeited if the manager leaves during the period.” (p.494) 
 
2.5 Bidding Firm’s Post-acquisition Performance  
Event study is commonly employed in empirical research to measure bidding firms post-
acquisition performance. This method is built on the Efficient Market Hypotheses (Fama, 1970), 
which states that a firm’s new information will be reflected in its stock price “immediately” and 
“unbiasedly”, thus market reactions are the correct prediction of firms’ development. In reality, 
because information about other firms can be released simultaneously, market evaluations 
capture the mixed news available at the same time rather than a specific piece of news. Event 
study, which adjusts event-period market reaction by subtracting benchmark portfolio return 
from firms’ stock returns, filters the impact of the contemporaneous market information on 
firms’ market value. Therefore, the impact of M&A on a firm’s current and future earning ability 
should be timely and accurately reflected by the changes in the market expectation. However, 
Dutta and Jog (2009) explore the adjustment of market reactions to M&A in the long term by 
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considering the abnormal returns in different event windows. They find that after 15 days of the 
announcement, the market corrects its overreactions in an opposite direction to be consistent with 
firms’ long-run stock performance. The inconsistence between market reaction and long-term 
performance is also verified by Gao (2010). 
Event study methodology is applied by a large body of studies to measure both the short run 
and the long-run post-acquisition performance. In a short run, which usually takes a few days, 
the announcement period cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the most well-known approach to 
evaluate firms’ post-announcement performance. However, in the long run, the proper proxies 
for bidding firms’ performance following acquisition transactions are questioned by recent 
studies (Ramaswamy & Waegelein, 2003; Dutta & Jog, 2009), and the most critical questions are 
the selections of event window and the benchmark (Tuch & O’Sullivan, 2007). 
 
 2.5.1 Bidding Firms’ Long-term Post-acquisition Performance  
Event studies are also used to measure bidding firms’ long-run post-acquisition performance, 
and the most commonly used methods are the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) and the 
calendar time abnormal return (CTAR). Barber and Lyon (1997), who develop the matched 
control portfolio of buy-and-hold abnormal return methodology, argue that the BHAR is the most 
precise and easiest way to interpret investment performance, because it reflects the investors’ 
investment activities. They also claim that “[c]umulative abnormal returns are a biased predictor 
of long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns” (p. 346) and that the absence of compounding in the 
cumulative abnormal return methodology contributes to a measurement bias. 
On the other hand, the buy-and-hold abnormal return also suffers from the rebalancing bias, 
and the skewness bias (Barber & Lyon, 1997). Dutta and Jog (2009) argue that the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return method faces the trade-off between statistical significance and benchmark 
selections. However, the skewness-adjusted t-test in the research of Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 
(1999) can eliminate the skewness bias. Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that the listing, the 
rebalancing, and the skewness biases in the BHAR approach can be mitigated by choosing 
controlling portfolio which matches the sample by size and book-to-market ratio. Using both 
market index returns and matched controlling portfolio return, Dutta and Jog (2009) prove that 
the latter one is superior in measuring the buy-and-hold 3 year abnormal returns. However, valid 
solutions to other problems, such as lack of model precision, compounding frequency (Fama, 
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1998), and the unavailability of stock market prices (Barber & Lyon, 1997) have not be 
developed yet. 
Another way to measure long-term performance is the calendar-time abnormal return (CTAR), 
under which the expected return of the benchmark portfolio is calculated by Fama and French 
three factor model. Fama (1998) indicates that the merit of this method is the disappearance of 
correlation among event-time performance. On the other hand, the multiyear dependence in 
BHAR is significant and drives the results to be unreliable (Mitchell & Stafford, 2000). 
However, the calendar-time abnormal returns are hard to be interpreted (Tuch & O’Sullivan, 
2007). Also, this method has the potential problems of inconstant factors and heteroskedasticiy 
in changing the portfolio per month (Williams, 2001).  
There are also doubts on the assumption and the proper usage of cumulative abnormal return. 
Many papers claim that the assumption of no information asymmetry or arbitrage limitations in 
the stock market is too strong to be reasonable in long term measurements. The information 
divergence between managers and investors deteriorates in the long-run, and the announcement 
period cumulative abnormal return fails to reflect bidders’ intrinsic value. Thus, some papers rely 
on the operating or financial measurements, such as operating cash flows (Healy et al., 1992), the 
cash flow to sales (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001), industry adjusted return on assets (Lu, 
2004), and industry-adjusted cash flow returns on market value of assets (Ramaswamy & 
Waegelein, 2003). 
 
Despite the inconsistent arguments in the literature of whether CEO compensation in M&A is 
linked to shareholders’ interest or managerial power in few papers, a more fundamental question 
of whether the different ownerships affect the properties of CEO compensation in M& is 
neglected in the literature. The effectiveness of compensation as a governance device greatly 
depends on whom the monitoring force is from and how significant the shareholders are. 
Therefore, we use ownership as a bridge in our next chapter to address the lack of consensus on 
the explanatory power between the traditional theory and the managerial power theory in the 
changes in CEO compensation and compensation structure in M&A. Moreover, we also 
investigate the determinants of CEO compensation structure in M&A and the relation between 
long-term and short term performance in the rest our study. 
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3 THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AND HYPOTHESES 
Prior studies document that firm size is a dominant determinant of CEO compensation 
(Roberts, 1956; McGuire et al., 1962; Rosen, 1982; Baker et al., 1988; Kroll et al., 1990 Murphy, 
1999). After M&A, firm capitalization quickly and considerably rises so that bidding managers 
appear to have “decent” excuse to bargain for higher compensation packages. However, the 
increasing rate of bidder CEO compensation has been shown to outpace the reasonable speed 
which is observed for a comparable size and performance (Conyon & Gregg, 1994; Girma et al., 
2006; Guest, 2009).  We verify this by proposing: 
 
H1a: CEO compensation rises faster through M&A than through internal growth. 
 
When ownership is diffused, there is little incentive for shareholders to oversee management 
decisions. Only large block shareholders can enjoy big enough benefits to justify devoting efforts 
and resources on monitoring (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). As a result, in widely held companies, 
shareholders suffer more from agency problem than in concentrated firms, as no shareholders are 
expected to stand out to pay the full monitoring costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Large 
institutional shareholders have more access to financial, human, and information resources to 
more actively and effectively prevent management from growing too much power and getting 
overpayments (Bebchuk & Fried; 2003). Similar to the effectiveness of discipline mechanism, 
the usefulness of concentrated institutional ownership in corporate governance is also highly 
doubted, since those large shareholders do not engage in the daily operations and decision-
making (Lane et al., 1998). To test the effect of institutional ownership on CEO compensation, 
we propose: 
 
H1b: Ceteris paribus, the increase in bidder executive compensation is lower in institution 
controlled firms than in widely held firms. 
 
Though empirical studies on CEO post-acquisition compensation challenge the fairness of 
increased payments (Mueller, 1969; Jensen, 1986; Datta et al., 2001; Dorata & Petra, 2008), the 
answers to questions such as why bidder CEO compensation skyrockets after M&A, who 
controls CEO compensation, and whether CEOs deserve the significant payments remain quite 
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unclear. To answer these and other related questions, we need to differentiate the widely held 
firms from institution controlled firms to investigate the powers between mangers and 
institutional shareholders. If large institutional shareholders maintain their controlling and 
decision-making rights, managers will have fewer opportunities for self-dealing and thus less 
success in raising their compensation without bringing benefits. Meanwhile, without monitoring, 
the CEO in a diffused ownership firm can arbitrarily increase compensation in M&A without 
improving firm value. That is, the linkage between performance and compensation in M&A is 
enhanced in institution controlled firms, while managerial power can increase the level of CEO 
compensation in widely held firms. 
  
H2a: In institution controlled firms, the level of CEO total compensation in M&A is positively 
associated with the firm performance.  
H2b: In institution controlled firms, the level of CEO total compensation in M&A is not 
positively associated with managerial power.  
H2c: In widely held firms, the level of CEO total compensation in M&A is positively associated 
with managerial power.  
H2d: In widely held firms, the level of CEO total compensation in M&A is not positively 
associated with the firm performance. 
 
Cash-based compensation is the reward for managers’ short-term performance, and executives 
who want to get more cash will focus on short-term achievements. CEOs with considerable 
managerial power are able to raise their cash payments without exhibiting superior performance 
if they are not under oversight. Compared with the widely held firms, institution controlled firms 
can mitigate the unreasonable growth of CEO cash compensation from managerial power by 
closely tying CEO cash compensation to the firm’s short-term performance in M&A. 
 
H3a: In institution controlled firms, the level of CEO cash-based compensation in M&A is 
positively associated with the firm’s short-term performance.  
H3b: In institution controlled firms, the level of CEO cash-based compensation in M&A is not 
positively associated with managerial power.  
H3c: In widely held firms, the level of CEO cash-based compensation in M&A is positively 
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associated with managerial power.  
H3d: In widely held firms, the level of CEO cash-based compensation in M&A is not positively 
associated with the firm’s short-term performance.  
 
Equity-based compensation is designed to lengthen managers’ horizon and to motivate them to 
focus on firms’ long-term development. Similar to CEO cash-based compensation, higher equity-
based compensation is accompanied by good long-term performance if corporate governance is 
strong and by managerial power otherwise. Since ownership is a major force of internal 
governance, we propose: 
 
H4a: In institution controlled firms, the level of CEO equity-based compensation in M&A is 
positively associated with the firm’s long-term performance. 
H4b: In institution controlled firms, the level of CEO equity -based compensation in M&A is not 
positively associated with managerial power.  
H4c: In widely held firms, the level of CEO equity-based compensation in M&A is positively 
associated with managerial power.  
H4d: In widely held firms, the level of CEO equity-based compensation in M&A is not positively 
associated with the firm’s long-term performance.  
 
CEO total compensation consists of cash-based and equity-based compensations, which are 
designed to motivate managers’ short-term and long-term performance respectively. Market 
expectations should reflect the impact of the M&A activities on share price; however, it has been 
shown to be biased surrounding the announcement days. Instead, firm performance in the long-
run can more accurately represent the firm’s true value. To determine whether market reaction 
can predict the firm’s benefits from M&A, we need to test whether firms long-run post-
acquisition performance are positively correlated with CARs. 
 
H5: Long-term post-acquisition performance is positively associated with the announcement 
period cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). 
 
Equity-based compensation is often provided as an incentive for managers to improve long-
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term performance. Therefore, if institutions are long-term investors, they will try to avoid 
management myopia by structuring CEO compensation contract to have a higher equity-based 
portion. This also applies to the rewards following M&A activity. In the firms without large 
institutional shareholders, CEOs will take advantage of their powerful position and their inside 
information to obtain more private benefits by selecting the type of their payments that benefits 
them the most. More specifically, in a widely held firm, if a merger transaction is likely to bring 
additional profits in the future, the CEO will choose more equity compensation, which is 
contingent on firms’ stock price. In contrast, if the firm’s value is expected to drop after the 
M&A, CEO will select a compensation structure that favours cash over equity-based 
compensation, as cash can be consumed immediately and is independent from firm’s future 
performance. 
 
H6a: In institution controlled firms, the CEO compensation following M&A will favour equity-
based compensation.  
H6b: If CEOs are the chairmen in the boards and firms’ value is expected to decrease, the CEO 
compensation following M&A will favour cash-based compensation. 
H6c: If CEOs are the chairmen in the boards and firms’ value is expected to increase, the CEO 
compensation following M&A will favour equity-based compensation. 
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4 DATA AND VARIABLES 
4.1 Data Selection 
The data for this study include executive compensation cover the 5-year period from 2001 to 
2005 inclusive. The main reason for this choice is to avoid using merger events from the crisis 
period. This constraint forces us to limit our data to 2005 or earlier as we want to measure the 
long term effects of a merger on the bidder by calculating the bidder’s performance over the four 
year period following that merger. Therefore, we need a window of four years after the last 
merger in our data to calculate the bidder’s long-term post-acquisition performance. For 
example, measuring the long term performance of a bidder that was involved in a merger in 2005 
requires data collected over the period 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. Second, the accounting rules 
related to disclosing executive compensation changed in 2006. Therefore, using 2005 and prior 
years for our executive compensation data assures us that the accounting standards of CEO 
compensation reports are consistent throughout all our observations.  
We identify all US public firms which engaged in M&A transactions between fiscal year 2001 
and 20054 from the SDC Platinum database. We require the deal size, announcement date, and 
effective date to be available for all observations and that the status of the deal is “Completed” 
rather than “Withdrawn” or “Pending”. Further, we exclude from the sample all companies that 
are classified as financial or utility firms (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999). The reasons are 
financial and utility firms are highly regulated industries, and they have more restricted M&A 
policies and different compensation properties, which are not comparable with firms in other 
industries. In order to avoid including mergers with economically insignificant impact, we 
require that a target’s total market value is at least 5% of the acquirer’s total market value 
measured four weeks prior to the announcement. Eventually, we limit our sample to a “clean 
set”, which does not include the firms that have multiple M&As per year (Coakley & Iliopoulou, 
2006) or have “overlap” (Harford & Li, 2007) with our long-term performance window. That is, 
if a firm completes more than one acquisition in one year, or another takeover is announced 
during the four years after completing the first acquisition, the firm is excluded as it is not 
possible to know whether the post-merger performance is from the first transaction or from the 
                                                             
4 The dates in SDC platinum are in calendar year format. To match the M&A data with CEO compensation and 
firms’ financial data, we obtain bidders’ fiscal ending month from the Compustat and convert calendar year into 
fiscal year. Originally, we extract M&A events from calendar year 2000 to 2006; after the transformation, those 
happened before fiscal 2001 or after fiscal 2005 are removed. 
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second one. Including such firms may bias the results. We filter out the firms with CEO turnover 
during our sample period as it is hard to attribute the changes in CEO compensation to either 
their performance or to their personal characteristics. Family firms have unique agency problems 
and governance mechanisms. Therefore, firms which are identified as family firms in the 
Anderson and Reeb’s (2004) dataset are also out of the scope of this thesis 5 . Lastly, all 
observations must be available in ExecuComp, Compustat, Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP), and Thomson Institutional Holdings databases. Eventually, our sample has 268 
merger events, which consist of 266 US firms during the period of 2001 to 2005. In addition, we 
also extract all available firms in the ExecuComp database from 2001 and 2005, which do not 
take any M&As, as the organic group to compare the growth of CEO compensation from M&A 
with the internal growth in model 5.1. 
The data of bidder CEO compensation and board of directors of the above firms are extracted 
from the ExecuComp, which provides us with annual compensation components and detailed 
CEO personal information, such as name, age, title, and whether the CEO is a board number. 
Bidders’ fiscal annual financial data are collected from the Compustat database, while daily as 
well as monthly stock prices are derived from the CRSP database. We download each 
institutional investor’s shareholding for each single bidder from the Thomson Institutional 
Holdings database. 
 
4.2 Variable Descriptions 
4.2.1 CEO Compensation  
Our dependent variable is CEO annual compensation during the year when the acquisition was 
completed. Specifically, we look at the seven components of a CEO compensation: base salary 
(SALARY), bonus (BONUS), other annual payment (OTHANN), restricted stock grants (STOCK), 
stock option grants (OPTION), long-term incentive payment (LTIP), and all other total 
compensation (ALLOTHTOT). In addition, we analyze the total compensation (TOTAL), 
measured by the sum of the 7 components (Almazan et al., 2005; Harford & Li, 2007). Other 
annual payment and all other total compensation are cash payments or cash-equivalent benefits, 
                                                             
5 The data can be obtained from their  website  http://astro.temple.edu/~dreeb/Working2.html. We assume family 
firms preserve their ownership structure, and we use the most recent year, 1999, data in Anderson and Reeb’s (2004) 
dataset to identify family controlled corporations. Furthermore, we also exclude the firms which are defined as 
family firms in their last available year. Results are quite stable and similar whether family firms are identified by 
the last year or the last available year. 
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such as perquisites and debt forgiveness6, which cannot be explicitly categorized into other 
groups. The grant date value is used to reflect the value of restricted stocks granted in that year 
while the value of granted stock options is computed by Standard & Poor's Black-Scholes 
methodology. Long-term incentive plan refers to a reward system, which aims to align the 
interests of executives and shareholders. Under this plan, CEO compensation is tied to firm long-
term (generally three years) performance. Executives can receive the entire payments only if they 
fulfill the profitability conditions or other objectives that firms want to achieve in the future.  
 To determine whether the value of CEO compensation is independent of performance, we 
classify the 7 components into cash-based compensation and equity-based compensation. Cash-
based compensation is comprised of cash, salary, other annual payment, and all other total 
compensation, while equity-based compensation includes restricted stock grants, stock option 
grants, and long-term incentive payments 7 . We compute the ratio of cash/equity-based 
compensation to the bidder CEO total compensation in the completion year and one year prior 
and make comparisons of the ratios between those two years. 5% change is used as a rule of 
thumb in our research to determine whether the bidder CEO compensation structure shifts to 
higher portion of cash or equity or remain the same in M&A. If the percentage of CEO 
cash/equity-based compensation after the takeover exceeds the percentage in the year prior to the 
merger transaction by more than 5%, we count this event as a change in the compensation 
structure. The observation with more than 5% increase in the percentage of CEO cash-based 
compensation is classified among the events where the CEO favours a cash payment. All such 
observations are placed in the cash group. We examine the impact of such group on 
compensation by making the vairiable TYPE equal to “CASH”. Likewise, if the ratio of CEO 
equity-based compensation grows by 5% or more after M&A, this observation is grouped into a 
subset that we call the equity group, and we label it as “EQUITY” under the variable TYPE. On 
the other hand, if the difference is less than 5%, then the variable TYPE is “NEUTRAL”, 
meaning no significant change in compensation structure takes place. 
 
                                                             
6  
The definition and items under each compensation component are according to the manual of the ExecuComp 
database.  
7 Murphy (1999) considers restricted stock and option grants to be equity, while Datta et al. (2001) only use new 
stock option grants to proxy for equity-based payment. However, the characteristics of long-term incentive payments 
are similar to those of equity grants. Therefore, it is more proper to incorporate it into the calculation of equity-based 
payment. 
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4.2.2 Performance 
4.2.2.1 Short-term Announcement Period Abnormal Return 
We use the abnormal return surrounding the acquisition announcement date as a proxy for a 
firm short-term stock performance. We measure the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as the 
difference between the actual return on the stock and the expected return estimated using the 
traditional market model:  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  4.1 
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the stock return of company i on day t obtained from the CRSP database. 
           𝑅𝑚,𝑡 stands for the stock return of the market portfolio m on day t obtained from the 
CRSP database. 
         𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are regression coefficients which capture the relationship between an individual 
stock return and market return. 
From the regression in 4.1, we can get α and β  for each company. In 4.2, we use the 
coefficients α and β, the firm stock return, and the market return to obtain the abnormal returns 
by  subtracting the expected returns from the real returns. Abnormal return reflects the impact of 
the newly released information on the fluctuation of stock price around the announcement day. 
Formally, the abnormal return is calculated as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡) 4.2 
Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the abnormal stock return of company i on day t, (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 ) represents 
expected stock return for company i on day t, and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡, Rm,t, ßi, and αi are as defined in equation 
4.1.  
In order to be consistent with previous studies of M&A and executive compensation (Grinstein 
& Hribar, 2004; Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006; Bugeja et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2001), we choose 
a two-day event window (-1, 0), consisting of one day prior to announcement and the 
announcement day, to construct our cumulative abnormal returns, CAR2: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(−1,0)= ∑𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
0
−1
 4.3 
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4.2.2.2 Long-term Market Adjusted Return and Calendar-time Abnormal Return with 
Fama-French Model 
What constitutes as the optimal measurement of post-event long-term performance has caused 
much controversy in the recent decades. Although the buy-and-hold (BAH) method and the 
Calendar-time Abnormal Return (CTAR) approach are widely used in prior studies, both of them 
have weaknesses. The buy-and-hold abnormal return deals with individual stocks. Except for the 
event-dependence issue (Mitchell & Stafford, 2000), the results generated from BAH is also 
subject to the choice of the beginning (buy) date and end of holding date. Therefore, we propose 
a modified approach to proxy for each bidder’s stock performance – the long-term market 
adjusted return (LTRETURN). As in Gao (2010) and Datta et al. (2001), a three-year period is 
employed to measure long-term performance.  
LTRETURN = 𝑅𝑖 - 𝑅𝑀 4.4 
Where 𝑅𝑖  is the stock return of company i over three years and 𝑅𝑀 is the three-year market 
return. Moreover, 𝑅𝑖 and 𝑅𝑀 are structured using the following equations: 
𝑅𝑖= 
𝑃𝑖
1 + 𝐷𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖
𝑜
𝑃𝑖
𝑜  4.5 
where 𝑃𝑖
𝑜=
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
0𝑡=𝑇
𝑡=1  and 𝑃𝑖
1=
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
1𝑡=𝑇
𝑡=1  
𝑅𝑀= 
𝑃𝑀
1 + 𝐷𝑚 − 𝑃𝑀
𝑜
𝑃𝑀
𝑜  4.6 
Where 𝑃𝑀
𝑜  and 𝑃𝑀
1  are the monthly value-weighted price index. 𝑃𝑖
𝑜 is the average of the daily 
stock price of company i over the starting one month while 𝑃𝑖
1 is the average of the daily stock 
price of company i over the ending one month. 𝐷𝑖 and 𝐷𝑚 are the monthly dividend for company 
i and the market portfolio during the three years.  
The starting month of LTRETURN is the first calendar-month immediately after the deal 
completion (t=1) and the last month is three years after the completion (t=36). Since it take some 
time for the bidders to adjust their organizations and operating strategies to achieving synergy 
after taking over another firm, to avoid the unclear impact of M&A, we choose another measure 
LTRETURN _1, which starts one year after the completion of the merger (t=13) and ends three 
years later (t=48), in robustness check. Stock prices are extracted from the CRSP database, and 
market price indices are exported from the Compustat. 
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Alternatively, in light of the introduction of calendar-time portfolio abnormal return (Fama, 
1998; Mitchell & Stafford, 2000), we also compute the Calendar-time Abnormal Return (CTAR) 
with Fama-French Model for different groups to compare their performance. The model is: 
𝑅𝑝𝑖,𝑡 - 𝑅𝑓,𝑡= α + β(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡)+s(SMB𝑡)+h(HML𝑡)+𝜀𝑖/𝑝,𝑡 4.7 
Where 𝑅𝑖/𝑝,𝑡 is the return of Portfolio 𝑝𝑖 at time t, 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the risk free rate at time t, and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is 
the market return at time t. Hence, 𝑅𝑝𝑖,𝑡- 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the excess return of Portfolio 𝑝𝑖, while 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −
𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the market excess return  or premium. SMB and HML control the size and book-to-
market value effects respectively. α represents the abnormal return, which we are interested in. 
The abnormal returns are denoted as CTAR (1,36) and CTAR_1 (13, 48). 
 
4.2.3 Transaction Characteristics and Executive Efforts 
Based on the literature of Grinstein and Hribar (2004) and Bugeja et al. (2012), we use the log 
value of the number of days to complete the deals (TIME), the dummy variable whether the 
target and the bidder are in the same industry (DUM_DIVERSITY), and the method of payments 
(DUM_SHAREONLY) to capture the transaction characteristics and thus managers’ efforts made 
in M&A. When a bidder acquires a target in a different industry (with different 4-digit primary 
SIC number 8 ), then DUM_DIVERSIFY equals to 1; otherwise it takes on the value of 0. 
DUM_SHAREONLY is a binary variable which equals to 1 when the bidder finances M&A with 
only shares. 
The time needed to complete a transaction proxies the size of the deals. It is expected to 
positively affect CEO compensation; however, whether the positive association is attricuted to 
the complexity of deal or the empire building is unclear. Moreover, there is also lack of 
consistent argument regarding whether acquiring a firm in the same industry needs more or less 
work than in a different industry (Harris, 1983; Cordeiro & Veliyath, 2003; Grinstein & Hribar, 
2004). Diversification in M&A would reduce firm value in general as CEO may try to lower 
personal exposure to firm specific risks and put firm profitabily on the second order (Jensen, 
1986; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1998).  Thus, we expect diversification is associated with short 
investment horizon. On the other hand, we expect paying the target with euqity represents long 
investment horizon, as the firm short-term value is not the priority to conducting M&A. 
                                                             
8 As a robustness test, we also used 2-digit SIC code, but the qualitative results remain unchanged. 
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4.2.4 CEO Power and Ownership Structure 
The linkage with the critical internal governance committees gives the executive strong 
influence over the firm’s decision making. Especially, if the CEO also takes the position of 
chairman of the board, then the CEO has significant power to approve the increase in the 
compensation packages (Crystal, 1991; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Gomez-Mejia, 1994; and 
Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2009). We control for the excess power of the executive when she serves 
as chairman of the board by setting the dummy variable DUM_CHAIRMAN equals 1 when CEO 
also serves as a chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. 
 CEO’s experience (TENURE) is also a standard proxy of managerial power (Mangel & Singh, 
1993). The longer the time a CEO stays in the company, the more proficient the CEO will be in 
extracting personal benefits from the business. High prestige and rich experience enable CEO to 
have substantial negotiation power (Singh & Harianto, 1989) and to gain trust from the boards 
(Alderfer, 1986), which in return help CEO bargain for private benefits. We expect the impact of 
CEO tenure on post-acquisition compensation to be positive. TENURE is measured by the 
number of years between the date of becoming CEO and the effective date of M&A.  
There is no consensus regarding the exact level of shares to distinguish large holders. A 5% cut 
off is widely used in the literature, such as Chang and Mais (2000), and Cordeiro and Veliyath 
(2003), but whether 5% equity holding is sufficient for institutional investors to monitor CEO 
compensation is different in the study of Riahi-Belkaoui and Pavlik(1993) and Mangel and Singh 
(1993). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) also use 10% and 20% as the thresholds. 
To address the non-linear monitoring effects from of different concentrations of ownership (Yen 
& André, 2007), we divide the institution controlled firms between weakly-controlled and 
strongly-controlled firms. Only 23 firms in our sample do not have a single institutional 
shareholder who owns more than 5% shares and only 8 firms have 20% or more of their shares 
controlled by one institutional owner. The lack of sufficient observations could cause bias in 
regressions. To solve this issue we consider a firm that has 6% institutional ownership or less to 
be widely held while a firm that has above 6% institutional ownership to be under institutional 
control. If the firm has a single institutional shareholder controlling 6% of shares but less than 
10%, we call it weakly institution controlled firm and denoted as DUM06_INST. If a single 
institution controlling 10% or more of a firm’s shares, the firm is classified as strongly institution 
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controlled firms and named DUM10_INSTI.  
 
4.2.5 Control Variables 
In addition to the above factors, CEO compensation also depends on firm SIZE, performance, 
such as ROA, and RETURN, SALES_GROWTH, and firm’ financial structure, LEVERAGE. We 
define SIZE as the logarithm of the firm’s book value of total asset at the end of the fiscal year 
before deal completion. ROA is the ratio of the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA) over total assets. RETURN is the firm’s fiscal year gross stock return, 
which is equal to the sum of the dividends paid during that fiscal year and the capital gains 
measured as the stock price at the end of the current fiscal year divided by stock price at the end 
of the previous fiscal year minus 1.  SALES_GROWTH is the growth rate of sales per year. 
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5 METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
5.1 Statistical Summary Table  
5.1.1 Are M&As Opportunities to Increase Executive Compensation? 
The descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in the fiscal year of accomplishing takeover 
are presented in Table 1. The amount of each component of CEO compensation are outlined in 
Panel A. Bidding CEOs are generally awarded with a total of $4,395.61 thousand on average in 
the year of finishing M&A. It is obvious that salary, bonus, restricted stock grant, and stock 
option grant are the most significant elements of CEO total compensation, which are $657, $693, 
$435, and $2,250 thousand respectively. While the base salaries are less volatile, the deviations 
of the stocks and options relative to their means are greater than that of bonus.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Figure 1 further discloses the detailed percentage of each component. Similar to the findings 
in the study of Datta et al. (2001), the biggest component is stock options, which accounts for 
more than half of CEO total compensation, followed by bonus and salary. Overall, the sum of the 
equity component of payments is twice as much as the cash-based component. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
The change in CEO compensation from M&A, measured by the amount in the completion 
year minus the amount paid one year prior, is listed in Table 1 Panel B. Bidders in our sample are 
granted significantly more salary, bonus, and other payments but less stock-based compensation. 
However, the increases in cash compensation do not exceed the reduction in the value of stock 
options. Thus, on average CEO total compensation declines by $651.927 thousands, but the 
decrease is not significantly different from zero. This finding contradicts the literature which 
concludes that bidders offer their CEOs significantly higher compensation in the M&A year 
(Harford & Li, 2007). The possible explanations could be as follows: 1) We examine the sample 
means while Harford and Li (2007) compare sample medians. To make the numbers comparable, 
we also take the difference of two sample medians. The median of the changes in CEO 
compensation is $123.84 thousand as shown in panel B, which is consistent with the growth in 
median in the study of Harford and Li (2007). 2) The differences in sample construction criteria 
between our study and the literature may result in different observations9, which in return may 
                                                             
9
 We look at CEO compensation in the completion year and one year prior whereas Harford and Li (2007) focus on 
CEO compensation in one year after completion and one year before the announcement. We employ 5% of bidders’ 
market value as the threshold to distinguish significant target from small deal while Harford and Li (2007) use10%. 
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have different properties. 3) Our data covers a sample period which is different from the period 
covered by the data of Harford and Li (2007). Therefore, executive compensation could be 
affected by the macro conditions in the financial market.  
 
We investigate further the impact of sample filters on our conclusions. First, we replicate the 
study of Harford and Li (2007) study based on their sample criteria and sample period, and then 
we apply their methodology to our sample period. We also work on Harford and Li’s (2007) 
sample period under our sample selection standards to fully address the concerns about sample 
selection and time period issue. The explicit demonstrations of CEO compensations are listed in 
Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Strictly following the steps in the study of Harford and Li (2007) which tests the M&A events 
from 1993 to 200010, we find in our replication CEO total compensation in the year after the deal 
completion is about $5.26 million on average and the median total compensation of 283 
observations is about $2.26 million11, which is comparable to Harford and Li’s (2007) findings. 
The univariate tests in Panel A disclose that salary, bonus, stock options, and all other total 
payments soar significantly, and the total compensation almost doubles after M&A.  
In Panel B, we use the same sample period which is from 1993 to 2000 but we use our 
methodology to form a sample. The definition of crucial transaction under our sample selection 
criteria is relatively loose. That is, we require the transaction to be at least 5% of the bidder’s 
market value instead of the 10% used by Harford and Li (2007) study. We end up with more 
events, and the mean executive compensation after M&A is almost $4.92 million, which is also 
close to that shown by Harford and Li (2007). Moreover, the average of CEO overall 
compensation rises significantly from $3.53 million to $4.92 million through M&A, and the 
increase is again statistically significant, verifying that what really matters in the direction and 
the significance of the change in CEO compensation is the time period rather than the differences 
                                                             
10 Besides the time period, Harford and Li (2007) identify the deals whose values are at least 10% of bidders’ 
market value at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announced as the significant transactions. They request no 
overlap or multiple M&A within two years. Excluding the firms that change their CEO between one year before the 
announcement and one year after the completion, they have 306 observations with the median of $3 million total 
compensation after the M&A activity. 
11 The median of CEO total compensation in our replication of the study of Harford and Li (2007) is not listed in 
table 2. 
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in the sample selection criteria.  
To further conduct a robustness check of our hypothesis that the period matters, we employ the 
the approach in the study of Harford and Li (2007) to our sample period in Panel C. The number 
of observations is lower than that under our mythology. Salary, bonus, restricted stock, and stock 
option grants are still the major components of total compensation. The average of option grants 
is a little bit lower than half of the average of total compensation but much higher than other 
constituents. The sign and the significance of the changes in each component slightly differ from 
those in our sample. However, the growth of the total compensation through M&A remains 
insignificantly different from zero.  
In summary, CEO total compensation following M&A mounts up from 1993 to 2000, which is 
in line with the traditional understanding that increased size through M&A enlarges 
compensation. However, over the period from 2000 to 2005, the total payments received by CEO 
after M&As do not deviate significantly from the total payments received in the year prior to the 
transactions. Although CEO cash compensation still goes up after M&A, CEO equity grants, 
especially stock options, distinctly shrink after M&A. This phenomenon can be explained by the 
M&A wave, the stock market, and the proliferation in the number of firms offering option 
compensation in 1990s.  
The drastic increase in the option-based compensation to CEOs of US companies during the 
1990s has attracted the attention of many scholars. They attribute the sudden significant changes 
to the influence of the accounting standards, tax regulations, financial market, and corporate 
governance. Murphy (2002) suggests that CEO compensation in large, smaller, and high-tech 
companies all increases and the increases mainly come from options.  
Murphy (2002) proposes a “perceived-cost” hypothesis as an explanation to the proliferation 
of stock option payments. The auther proposes that the “perceived” value, instead of economic 
value, is used for the design of CEO compensation. Therefore, options are undervalued by both 
corporations and undiversified managements, and options are overpaid. After the introduction of 
the Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) in 1993, firms switched CEO compensation from 
cash to equity-based payments (Perry & Zenner, 2000) to avoid deducting excessive amounts 
from income as expenses and reduce the negative impact that the vast executive compensation 
has on firm value (Hall & Murphy, 2003). 
 On the other hand, the drawbacks of stock options are also recognized by some experts. Hall 
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and Murphy (2003) find that after reaching the peak in 2000 option grants begin to drop greatly. 
They argue that shifting towards more options is not appealing to all-level employee after 2000 
when the stock market turned into cold, and the value of options is negatively affected by firm 
value. Moreover, Kolev (2008) proves that with stock options executive compensation is far 
more tied to firms’ stock price. Thus, compensation depends on the entire financial market rather 
than individual performance. Therefore, in the bull equity market during the 1990s and especially 
the late 1990s, CEO total compensation booms. Afterwards, their payments drop with the 
financial market recession (Kolev, 2008). 
Because of the bull market before 2000 and the tax advantages, options grants as well as total 
compensation increased overtime and thus soared after M&As. However, when the market 
settled down after 2000, investors realized options are not as efficient as they expected, and they 
tended to be rational in compensating CEOs with options after M&As. Further, during the period 
of 2001 to 2005, M&A activities were not sufficient for executives to bargain for more payments.  
 
5.1.2 What Are the Characteristics of the Bidder Firms in Our Sample? 
    Table 3 addresses the properties of the explanatory variables and the control variables in our 
models. Panel A reports that the average bidder size before M&A is about $3,244 million. Panel 
B shows that the market in general does not take the announcement of M&A as a good signal, 
because the average abnormal return in the 2-day window is -0.004, which is comparable with 
other research, such as Datta et al. (2001) and Grinstein and Hribar (2004). However, in the long-
term, the market tends to favor M&A, and the abnormal returns become positive. When allowing 
for one year of integration, the three year abnormal return reaches 0.003 and the three year 
adjusted buy-and-hold period return is 0.168. On the other hand, Panel C reports that the average 
value of the acquired targets12 is $1.199 billion, suggesting that bidders are able to enlarge their 
size by 40% through M&A, which is very close to the study of Guest (2009) that the relative size 
of the target is 33% of the total bidders. Moreover, M&A transactions take from 0 days to 486 
days (1.33years) to completion while the average time to completion is approximately 74 days (2 
and a half months), which supports the statement that M&As are the most significant and 
complicated corporate capital investments. The percentage of cross-industry M&As, which are 
                                                             
12 The transaction value is not included in any regressions because it is highly correlated with bidder firm size and 
time to completion as well. However, it is an important measure to reflect how big the bidders in different groups 
aim to acquire. Thus, we put it in the summary statistic table. 
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intended for diversification purposes, is 55.6%, which is a bit higher than that in Grinstein and 
Hribar’s (2004) sample but similar to the result of Harford and Li (2007). The percentage in our 
sample is higher because we use a four-digit SIC code instead of two. We also test two-digit SIC 
code for our classification, but the results are qualitatively similar; hence, we do not report the 
results here. In addition, only 9% of acquirers pay the targets with only shares. Our sample 
shows that 38.1% of bidders have at least one institutional investor who holds between 6% and 
10% of the outstanding shares. In contrast, 45.5% of the firms have at least a shareholder owning 
more than 10% of the outstanding shares.  
[Insert Table 3] 
 
5.1.3 Do the Cash, Neutral, and Equity Groups Differ from Each Other? 
Table 4 compares the performance and characteristics of the firms in the cash, neutral, and 
equity group. The table shows that the bidder size, measured by the book value of the assets at 
the fiscal year end prior to M&A, does not vary significantly among the cash, neutral, and equity 
groups. However, the targets in cash group are more than two times bigger on average than in the 
equity group. The average time needed to complete the deal is the shortest in the cash group. In 
terms of accounting performance, the ROA of the firms in the cash group is the worst and the 
degree of financial leverage is the lowest for this group as well, implying that CEOs whose 
compensation after mergers shifts to a higher percentage of cash are more likely to pursue their 
empire building in M&A. Despite the insignificant market reaction during the announcement of 
M&A, the equity group has a higher 3-year stock return starting immediately after the 
completion and from one year after the completion as well. One possible explanation is that 
equity compensation seems to inspire CEOs to take value-enhancing acquisitions and thus is 
usually associated with better long-term performance (Datta et al., 2001). Alternatively, CEOs 
could use their insider information to estimate firms’ future value and then choose the form of 
compensation. The above analyses suggest that within firms in the cash group larger 
compensation is associated with bigger size rather than good firm performance. Panels D and 
Panel E indicate that neither managerial power nor large institutional shareholders has direct 
association with the changes towards more cash or equity payments in M&A.  
[Insert Table 4] 
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5.1.4 Do the Widely Held, Weakly Institution Controlled, and Strongly Institution 
Controlled Groups Differ from Each Other? 
Table 5 compares the levels of post-acquisition compensation among the institution controlled 
firms and widely held firms. Similar comparisons are conducted for the change in compensation 
through M&A. 
[Insert Table 5] 
Panel A suggests that cash and equity compensations are the highest in the widely held firms 
and the lowest in the strongly institution controlled firms. CEO bonus compensation in widely 
held firms is almost twice as much as that the strongly institution controlled firms but the stock 
options compensation does not seem to vary too much. When we look at the changes in CEO 
compensation in each group, Panels B, C, and D suggest that though the decreases in CEO total 
compensation alleviate in the group with intense institutional ownership, none is significantly 
different from zero. In the widely held firms, the cash-based compensation jumps up by 
$630.869 thousand, but the increases are much lower or insignificant in the institution controlled 
groups. The option compensation drops greatly in the widely held firms while in institution 
controlled firms the changes are insignificant. 
 
As shown in Table 6, both the book value of the bidders and the value of the transactions 
within the widely held group are several times higher than those in the institution controlled 
groups. The widely held firm can increase its capitalization by 45.63% after the M&A, while the 
weakly and strongly institution controlled firms would only enlarge their size by 34.74% and 
27.26% respectively. Thus, the widely held firms aim to build empire, which can be captured by 
the absolute and relative size of the transactions. Surprisingly, the market does not tend to favour 
the announcement of M&A made by any groups of firms, but the strongly institution controlled 
firms have the best stock performance from one year after the M&A to the following 3 years. 
More analysis will be conducted in the next session. 
[Insert Table 6] 
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5.2 Regressions and Results 
5.2.1 Is the Increase in CEO Compensation in Widely Held Firms and Institution 
Controlled Firms the Same ? (Hypothesis 1)  
We start our exploration of CEO compensation by verifying the change in CEO compensation 
through M&A in different groups as well as different years and comparing the change in M&A 
firms with the organic group. Eventually, 266 M&A firms and non-M&A ExecuComp firms 
between 2001 and 2005 are used to examine the joint impact of M&As and institutional 
ownership on the level of CEO compensation. Model 5.1 is used for this analysis:  
Compit= α + β1 ∗ sizeit−1 + β2 ∗ ROAit + β3 ∗ ROAGrowthit 
+β4 ∗ SalesGrwothit + β5 ∗ Returnit + β6 ∗ MTBVit 
+β7 ∗ Dum_mait + β8 ∗ Dum06_instiit + β9 ∗ Dum10_instiit 
+β10 ∗ Dum_ma_dum06 + β11 ∗ Dum_ma_dum_10 
+Year_fixed + Industry_fixed + εit 
5.1 
The dependent variable in Model 5.1 (COMP) is CEO compensation received in year t. The 
set of control variables are based on the studies of Grinstein and Hribar (2004), Coakley and 
Iliopoulou (2006), and Bugeja et al. (2012)13. SIZE is the book value of the total assets at the 
beginning of the year. ROA is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, 
and amortization (EBITDA) to the book value of total assets while RETURN is the raw stock 
return of bidders i at the fiscal year end t. We estimate ROA_GROWTH and SALES_GROWTH 
are the growth rates of ROA and sales respectively. MTBV is the market to book ratio. DUM_MA 
identifies the M&A events. It equals to 1 if the firm completes a takeover in year t and zero 
otherwise. DUM06_INSTI indicates institution controlled firms with at least one shareholder who 
owns between 6% and 10% of shares and DUM10_INSTI indicates institution controlled firms 
with 10% or more ownership of shares. DUM_MA_DUM06 and DUM_MA_DUM10 are the 
products of the merger dummy variable and institutional ownership dummy variables.  
 
Before running the regression, we test the correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables 
in Model 5.1. Table 7 illustrates the correlations between the various pairs of variables are 
                                                             
13 Grinstein and Hribar (2004), Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006), and Bugeja et al. (2012) also include margin and the 
growth of margin among the control variables. However, we find those two variables are highly correlated with 
ROA and ROA_Growth (the correlation coefficients are 0.9 and 0.8). To avoid possible multicollinearity problem, 
we drop margin and the growth of margin but add MTBV to substitute their effects. 
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between 0.124 and -0.366. Stock return (RETURN), ROA, and MTBV measure firm performance 
in stock, accounting, and growth, Thus they are positively related to each other. High leverage is 
associated with big size, low ROA and lower return, as bigger companies are able to raise and 
manage debt. High level of debt produce more interest payments and thus more financial 
pressure. In the extreme case of overwhelming debt, firms could be forced into bankruptcy.  
Therefore, lower profits are generated in the firm with high leverage.  
[Inset Table 7] 
The regressions of CEO compensation and compensation components are tested and listed in 
the different columns in Table 8. Following the literature, we test CEO total compensation, bonus 
payments, salary plus bonus, stock option, and stock plus option grants in five columns. The 
SIZE, ROA, SALES_GROWTH, RETURN, and LEVERAGE are the dominant determinants of 
CEO compensation and compensation constituents. A bigger organization (SIZE) and higher 
growth opportunity (SALES_GROWTH) demand more knowledge and energy (Harford & Li, 
2007) from the CEO. The CEO should be rewarded for better performance (ROA and RETURN) 
(Murphy, 1999).  High LEVERAGE exposes managers to more risk and the CEO should be 
rewarded for tolerating this risk.  
[Inset Table 8] 
The coefficient of DUM_MA is positive and significant in almost all regressions except for the 
sum of stock and option grants, suggesting that CEOs in widely controlled firms on average 
receive substantially higher compensation in terms of bonus, salary plus bonus, stock option 
grants, and total compensation through acquiring other firms than through internal growth. The 
high growth of compensation in M&A is consistent with the findings by Girma et al. (2006), 
Guest (2009), and Bugeja et al. (2012). However, the slope coefficients of DUM06_INSTI and 
DUM10_INSTI are insignificant in all regressions. The interaction terms, DUM_MA_DUM06 
and DUM_MA_DUM10, have significant impacts only on the regression of CEOs bonus 
payments and salary plus bonus payments. The F test of the joint effects of institutional dummy 
variables and their interaction terms shows that CEO cash compensation after M&A is 
significantly lower in the institution controlled firms than in widely held firms. 
 After controlling for performance and firm-specific characteristics, the indications from the 
regressions are in line with what we find in Table 5. In diffused ownership firms, CEOs bargain 
for higher cash compensation after conducting takeovers. However, compared with the widely 
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held firms, the weakly and strongly institution controlled firms reduce the increase in CEO bonus 
compensation by $451.770 and $337.314 thousands respectively, and the reduction effects are 
more remarkable in CEO salary plus bonus packages. This finding confirms the study of Hartzell 
and Starks (2003) that institutional investors reduce the level of CEO salary. Meanwhile, CEO 
equity compensation in the institution controlled firms does not differ from the comparable 
compensation in the widely held firms as none of the interacted terms is significant in the 
regression of equity compensation.  
One possible explanation is that, large institutional shareholders conduct their duties of 
preventing top managers from extracting rent in M&A by controlling CEO cash compensation 
and by simultaneously maintaining or increasing CEO equity-based incentive payments (Riahi-
Belkaoui & Pavlik, 1993, Hartzell & Starks, 2003). Under this interpretation, shifts in CEO 
compensation structure in M&A should be influenced by institutional ownership, or the linkage 
between CEO equity payments and firm short-term or long-term performance should exist, as a 
result of large institution shareholders’ monitoring. An alternative interpretation could be that 
institutions are not able to tell the impact of M&As on firms’ future development right after the 
transactions. Therefore, CEO equity compensation is adjusted in several years according to long-
term performance instead of in the completion year.    
 
Before conducting more investigations, we examine the monitoring effects of institutional 
large shareholders one more time in Model 5.2. In this analysis, we focus only on CEO 
compensation in M&A years by taking into account performance surrounding the announcement 
of the event, transaction-level characteristics, managerial power, and the control variables 
identified by Model 5.1 to be determinants of CEO compensation. Following the method in 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004), Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006), and Bugeja et al. (2009), we inherit 
the significant explanatory variables of CEO compensation from the previous model to account 
for firm-specific characteristics. CEO compensation in M&A should also be affected by the 
characteristics of transactions and corporate governance associating with the deals. We expect 
institution dummies to remain positive and significant in those cross-sectional regressions in 
Model 5.2. 
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Comp = α+𝛽1* performance +𝛽2* transaction-level characteristics 
+𝛽3* power +𝛽4 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙+𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖*D𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 
+Year_fixed + Industry_fixed + εit       
5.2 
The dependent variables are CEO total compensation, bonus only, salary plus bonus, option 
only, and stock plus option in the completion years. Performance variables include short-term 
performance CAR2 and long-term performance LTRETURN. Transaction-level characteristics are 
the time to complete (TIME), the indicator whether the target and the bidder are in the same 
industry or not (DUM_DIVERSIFY), and the method of payment (DUM_SHAREONLY). 
Managerial power variables include the dummy variable which identifies whether the CEO is 
also a chairman (DUM_CHAIRMAN) and the CEO’s tenure (TENURE). Institutional dummy 
variables again are DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. Firm size (SIZE), ROA, 
SALES_GROWTH, RETURN, LEVERAGE, year and industry fixed effect are the control 
variables inherited from Model 5.1.  
The Pearson correlations analysis in Table 9 suggests 30 statistically significant correlation 
coefficients, with the highest being approximately 0.474 between LTRETURN and TIME and the 
lowest -0.256 between ROA and DUM_SHAREONLY. The results of the regressions are 
summarized in Table 10.   
[Insert Table 9] 
[Insert Table 10] 
Table 10 shows that the significant determinants of CEO total compensations are firm size, 
which is consistent with the literature (Roberts, 1956; Simon, 1957; McGuire et al., 1962; Rosen, 
1982; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Baker et al., 1988; Murphy, 1999), and whether the method of 
payment in M&A is shares only or not.  
CEO cash compensation is positively associated with company size.  The complexity of the 
deal, proxied by the time to complete the transactions, is also a determinant of the cash 
compensation. This result is in line with Grinstein and Hribar (2004). When firms are 
diversifying through M&A, their CEOs’ bonus increases accordingly but their options are 
reduced at the same time. The result is consistent with the theory of options which indicates that 
the value of options is positively related to the volatility of the underlying asset. As diversifying 
takeovers are intended to reduce volatility, this theory predicts that diversifying transactions are 
wealth-reducing transactions for CEOs who hold significant options. Thus, a diversifying 
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transaction may lead a CEO to prefer cash over equity-based compensation. 
Our results also show that when managers use only equity to finance M&A, they receive 
higher combined stock and option compensation packages. Different from cash financing, equity 
financing does not require cash flow and thus does not require new debt issuing, which could be 
a burden due to the interest payments and lead firms to financial distress and perhaps bankruptcy 
in the extreme situations (Ramaswamy & Waegelein, 2003). Even though the market takes equity 
financing as a negative signal to a firm’s valuation in the short-run, if the bidder takes this 
opportunity to enjoy a lower cost of M&A, firms will benefit from it in the long-run. Datta et al. 
(2001) show that firms which pay targets with only cash experience worse long-term 
performance than the bidders who pay with stocks or a combination of stocks and cash. Thus, 
managers who finance the transactions with only shares prefer equity payemnts. 
We do not find any evidence that CEO compensation is linked to firm performance. On the 
other hand, CEOs receive higher salary and bonus when they serve as chairmen of the board, as 
the coefficient of DUM_CHAIR is positive and significant. The coefficients of institutional 
ownership dummy variables, DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI, are negative and significant in 
the regressions of the bonus and salary plus bonus. In the presence of weak institutional 
shareholders, CEOs are granted with $319.799 thousand less in bonus and $318.297 thousand 
less in sum of salary and bonus payments than in the widely held firms. If the firms are strongly 
controlled by institutional shareholders, those firms pay $431.770 thousand less in bonus and 
$414.023 thousand less in salary and bonus to their CEOs than widely held firms. Our results are 
in line with the study of Hartzell and Starks (2003) that CEO compensation is reduced in 
concentrated institutional ownership as well as the study of Mangel and Singh (1993) that 
institutional investors reduce CEO cash compensation. Although the amount of cash payments in 
terms of bonus and salary in M&A can be effectively controlled by large institutional 
shareholders, CEO equity compensation and total compensation in firms with concentrated 
institutional ownership are not significantly different from the comparable compensation 
components in widely held firms. We confirm that the presence of large institution shareholders 
could reduce the increase in CEO cash payments but not equity payments in M&A. 
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5.2.2 Is CEO Compensation Linked to Performance in Widely Held Firms and Institution 
Controlled Firms? (Hypothesis 2-4a,d) 
So far the results indicate that large institutional shareholders control CEO cash compensation. 
However, we do not know whether institutional ownership increases or reduces CEOs’ 
motivation in M&A or whether managerial power also plays an important role or not. If the large 
institution shareholders take charge of the design of CEO compensations, the increase should 
come from the boost in firm performance. If managerial power dominates, we should not find 
any relations between payments and performance measured by either market reaction or long-
term stock return. Thus, we use interacted variables between short-term/long-term performance 
with institutional dummies respectively in Table 11 and 12 to differentiate the pay-for-
performance relations in institution controlled firms from widely held firms.  
Comp = α+𝛽1* performance +𝛽2* transaction-level characteristics+𝛽3* power  
+𝛽4 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙+𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖*D𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 +𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖2*D𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 *performance  
+Year_fixed + Industry_fixed + εit                           
5.3 
[Inset Table 11] 
[Inset Table 12] 
In Table 11, we use CAR2_DUM06 and CAR2_DUM10, which are respectively the products 
of short-term performance CAR2 and institution dummy variables DUM06_INSTI and 
DUM10_INSTI. Both of them are positive and significant in the regressions of CEO cash 
compensations, while the coefficients of CAR2 are negative and significant. Since the results in 
table 5 indicate that the short-term performance in widely held firms is negative but insignificant, 
the negative coefficients of CAR2 on CEOs bonus and salary plus bonus suggest that although 
the market does not react positively to the announcement of M&As in widely held firms, CEOs 
still receive more cash after the deals. On the other hand, in weakly institution controlled firms, 
the linkages between short-term performance and bonus increase significantly by 5,076 and the 
relation with salary plus bonus payments increase significantly by 5,916. Though the increases 
are less in strongly institution controlled firms, the linkages are still positive and significant to 
conclude that the association between cash payments and short-term performance is positive, 
verifying that the pay-for-performance sensitivities are enhanced in institutional ownership 
(Hartzell & Starks, 2003). Besides, we confirm that the relation between the monitoring effects 
and the concentration of institutional ownership is non-linear (Yen & André, 2007). 
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However, again, we do not find any significantly association between large institutional 
shareholders and CEO equity compensation, as none of the interacted terms or the institution 
dummies is significant. Since equity payments motivate managers’ behaviour in the long-term, 
we substitute the interacted terms with the products of firm long-term performance and 
institution dummy variables, named LTRETURN_DUM06 and LTRETURN_DUM10 in Table 12. 
The relations do not exist in either widely held firms or institution controlled firms. Thus, there is 
no indication that large institutional shareholders change CEO equity compensation after M&A 
to quickly and effectively linked to firm long-term performance. 
 
5.2.3 Is Bidders’ Long-term Performance Predictable from Market Reactions? (Hypothesis 
5) 
One proposal of the lack of large institutional shareholders’ control over CEO equity 
compensation in the completion year could be that shareholders as outsiders have no information 
to estimate the long-term impact of M&A on firm performance, unless the announcement day 
market reaction is a good indicator of long-term performance of the bidder. The relation between 
event-date abnormal returns and long-term stock returns is seldom directly tested. Harford and Li 
(2007) claim no correlations, but they neither provide any evidence nor illustrate how they test it. 
Therefore, we use Model 5.4 to explore the relation in a set of regressions: 
Long-term performance = α+𝛽1* short-term performance (+𝛽2* control ) 
(+Year_fixed + Industry_fixed) + εit    
5.4 
   The bidder’s post-acquisition long-term performance in Model 5.4 is LTRETURN, while the 
cumulative abnormal return within two days (CAR2) proxies for short-term performance. 
Control factors include size (ME-market value of equity) and book-to-market ratio (BE/ME-the 
ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of the equity) based on Fama and French 
(1993). In addition, we control for the year-fixed effects and industry-fixed effects. The results 
are listed in Table 13. 
[Insert Table 13] 
  We start our regression without controlling for size, book-to-market ratio, year-fixed effects, 
and industry-fixed effects. The result is reported in the first column of Table 13. The intercept 
coefficient is 0.104 and is significant at the  5% level, but the slope coefficient, -0.158, is not 
significantly different from zero. Moreover, the probability of F-value is 0.851, much greater 
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than 10%, suggesting that the goodness of the fit of this regression is very low. In the next 
column, we add year- and industry-fixed effects to control for macro-economic and industry 
impacts. Nevertheless, the regression remains insignificant. In the third regression, we control for 
firm size and book-to-market ratio. The R-squared and adjusted R-squared increase slightly, but 
the probability of F-value is 0.145 still higher than 10%. Therefore, none of our results suggests 
a firm long-term post-acquisition performance is predictable from its short-term performance. 
Our finding is consistent to the study of Harford and Li (2007), which indicates that using 
announcement period abnormal returns and 3-year post acquisition returns as the proxies for 
performance generates totally opposite results. They also propose that long-term performance 
can more accurately reflect CEO performance and thus is a more appropriate measure for CEO 
compensation. 
 
5.2.4 Does Managerial Power Affect CEO Compensation? (Hypothesis 2-4 b,c) 
We find that in institution controlled firms, positive market reaction would trigger the growth 
of CEO cash compensation. However, the driving factors behind the growth of CEO options and 
stocks are not clear. In Model 5.5, we examine whether managers use their controlling power in 
the board to ask for more compensation in different ownerships 
Comp = α+𝛽1* performance +𝛽2* transaction-level characteristics +𝛽3* power 
 +𝛽4 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙+𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖*D𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖+𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖2*D𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖*power  
 +Year_fixed + Industry_fixed + εit   
5.5 
 [Insert Table 14] 
In our previous regressions, we show that CEO duality has strong impact on the increase in 
CEO cash compensation through M&A, which is in line with the findings by Grinstein and 
Hribar (2004) and Core et al. (1999) that CEO duality increases CEO bonus and salary 
payments. However, when we decompose our sample into widely held firms and institution 
controlled firms in Table 14, the significant effects disappear. Despite the insignificant 
coefficients of DUM_CHAIR_DUM06 and DUM_CHAIR_DUM10 in all five regressions, the F-
test of institution dummy variables and interactions shows that the joint effects are negative and 
statistically significant in the regression of CEO cash compensation. Compared with diffused 
firms, large institutional shareholders who own between 6% and 10% of firms’ total shares will 
reduce their CEO bonus compensation by $407.641 ($165.910+$241.731) thousand. The 
42 
 
reduction in bonus is $487.671($335.645+$152.026) thousand in firms with 10% and plus 
concentrated institutional ownership. The same effects could also be found in the CEO salary and 
bonus payments. However, institutional shareholders do not control mangers’ rent extraction  
from equity compensation.  
 
Taking all the information in Table 11, 12, and 14 together, we can conclude that large 
institutional shareholders significantly limit the increases in CEO cash compensation through 
M&A. Moreover, large institutional shareholders reduce extraction of cash via CEO influence 
over the boards and enhance the effectiveness of performance rewarding devices. In institution 
controlled firms, CEO cash compensation is positively related to market reactions to the 
announcement of M&A instead of managerial power. In widely held firms, CEOs still receive 
more cash even when the performance is bad. Intense institutional ownership oversees CEO cash 
compensation, and the monitoring effect is slightly different in different levels of concentrations. 
The reduction in CEO cash compensation is lower but the pay-for-performance is higher in 
weakly institution controlled firms than those in strongly institution controlled firms. However, 
institutional ownership does not seem to affect CEO equity grants in the completion year. The 
lack of such control could be justified on the basis that it is difficult to predict the firm long-term 
performance right after a merger or an acquisition, because our analysis shows that 
announcement-day market reactions are not predictors of long-term performance.  
 
5.2.5 Which Factors Affect the Changes in CEO Compensation Structure? 
5.2.5.1 Multinomial Logistic Regression 
We examine whether institutional ownership also affects CEO compensation structure. We 
track the shifts of the structure and investigate the determinants of the shifts in M&A using 
multinomial logistic regressions Model 5.6: 
Type= α + 𝛽1* performance + 𝛽2* transaction-level characteristics+ 𝛽3* power 
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖*D𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟*D𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟*long-term performance 
+ Year_fixed + Industry_fixed + εit 
5.6 
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Dependent variables TYPE14 in Model 5.6 includes cash, neutral and equity three categories. 
Since we are interested in the changes in compensation structure and the determinants of the 
changes, we set the neutral group to be the base group in the multinomial logistic regeression. 
The control variables are the same as in Model 5.2. The product of CEO power and long-term 
performance is noted as LTRETURN_CHAIR. It reflects the impact of CEO power on selecting 
between cash or equity-based on their inside information about the firm long-term prospects. We 
expect it to be negative in the regression of CASH and positive in the regression of EQUITY. If 
large institutional shareholders control the design of CEO compensation contracts as predicted 
by the traditional theory, institution dummy variables should be negative (positive) in the 
regression of CASH (EQUITY) so that more incentives could be provided. The results are 
reported in Table 15 Panel A. 
 
[Insert Table15] 
According to Table 15 Panel A , neither large institutional shareholders nor CEO duality along 
with their expectations of firm long term performance have impact on changes in CEO 
compensation structure, as the coefficients of DUM06_INSTI, DUM10_INSTI, and 
LTRETURN_CHAIR are not significantly different from 0 in the regression of CASH or EQUITY. 
The structure of CEO compensation tends to be more stable when the CEO stays longer in a 
firm. Thus, the coefficients of TENURE are negative in both regressions. Managerial power 
enables CEOs to extract cash by increasing the likelihood of having heavier weight of cash 
compensation in M&A regardless of their performance. ROA is negatively related with the 
likelihood to favour cash over equity. CAR2, on the other hand, enhances the chances to 
switching for more cash as cash compensation is attached to short term performance. In a large 
company, CEOs are less like to increase the percentage of their equity compensation in M&A, 
while leverage accelerates the tendency to have more equity. 
 
5.2.5.2 Two-stage Regression 
We propose that managers would favor a type of their compensation based on their evaluation 
of the impact of M&A on firm stock price in the long run. However, CEO compensation strucute 
                                                             
14 We also use 10% to define cash, netural, equity groups, but the significance of the results in multinominal 
regressions and the two-stage regressions does no change. 
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could influence the management incentive in M&A as well to improve firm future value or to 
benefit themselves. Datta et al. (2001) find that firms who compensate their CEOs with higher 
percentage of equity have better 3-year post-acquisition performance. Based on the study of 
Datta et al. (2001) and Gao (2010), long-term performance is a function of firms’ characteristics, 
corporate governance, CEO compensation, and M&A deals. To test whether the compensation 
structure affects firm long-term post-acquisition performance, we run the regression of firm long-
term post-acquisition performance in our sample, but our results suggest the change in the 
compensation structure is not a significant determinant. However, we do not rule out the 
possibility of suffering from endogeniety problem. To address this potential problem, we adopt a 
two-stage multinomial logistic regression in this section. 
Lagged value is widely used as an instrument variable to solve the endogeniety. According to 
the study by Oler and Waegelein (2011) and Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003), pre-acquistion 
performance is highly related to firm post-acquisition performance in the long-run. Therefore, 
We employ a 3-year performance before M&A (LTRETURN_PRE) as the instrumental variable 
and run the regression of post-acquisition performance on pre-acquisition performance after 
controlling for firm characteristics and year fixed effect. Then we put the fitted value of post-
acquisition performance (LTRETURN_F) from the first stage as one of the explanatory variable 
in the second stage regression of CEO compensation structure while the rest of the variables 
remain the same as Model 5.6. The results are shown in Table 15 Panel B. 
None of the coefficients of LTRETURN_F, DUM06_INSTI, DUM10_INSTI, and the interacted 
term of fitted long-term performance and CEO as chairman dummy LTRETURN_F_CHAIR is 
statistically significant. Compared with the regression in Panel A, only firm size, ROA, and CEO 
tenure remain their explanatory power. After we control for the potential endogenous variable, 
our results still indicate that neither institutional ownership nor CEO power manipulate the 
switch of one type of CEO compensation in M&A  to the other one.  
 
All of the above regression analyses confirm that in widely held firms, CEOs compensation 
increases more after M&A than through internal growth. Large institutional shareholders control 
the rapid growth in CEO cash compensation by tying the rewards to market expectations and by 
suppressing the growth from managerial power. However, institutional ownership does not show 
any better control over CEO equity compensation or over the changes in CEO compensation 
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structure in M&A. Managerial power along with the impact of M&A on firm long-term 
development is also not a determinant of the shifts of CEO compensation structure.  
 
5.3 Robustness Tests  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the measures of firm long-term performance all suffer different 
problems. Therefore, we use three different methods to calculate the long term returns and we 
repeat our tests to see whether the method of calculation affects our results. This analysis is 
presented in this chapter. 
 
5.3.1 Allowing One Year for Reorganization  
Merging two companies is a complicated task and it may take a long time for shareholders to 
realize the benefits. After acquiring another firm, the bidder needs to integrate operations, reduce 
redundant resources, and set up the appropriate divisions. In the meantime, the market will learn 
about the changes as they are announced and will re-evaluate the firm’s prospects. We propose 
that allowing time for re-organization may provide a clearer picture of the impact of M&A on 
bidders’ long-term performance.  
We conduct a robustness test in which we measure long term performance over a three-year 
period starting one year after the completion of the merger.  We realize that the time needed for 
integration varies from transaction to another and can range from few months to a number of 
years depending on the complexity of the transaction. However, we select a one year lag as 
during this time the bidders would have reported the audited annual financial statements and 
managements have had the opportunity to discuss the realized synergies and the anticipated 
changes in financial performance. 
Specifically, we use LTRETURN_1 to denote the lagged long term return. The computation of 
LTRETURN_1 is similar to the computation of LTRETURN (Section 4.2.2.2) except that the 
period over which the long term return is measured is delayed one year. For example, if for a 
particular firm LTRETURN is measured over the period of January 15, 2003 to January 15, 2006, 
then LTRETURN_1 would be measured over the period of January 15, 2004 to January 15, 2007. 
As there is no significant changes of the sign and the magnitude of coefficients of other 
explanatory and control variables from the robustness check, to save the space and to make it 
distinct, we only report the coefficients of the new proxies in Tables 16.  
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 [Insert Table 16] 
The signs and the significances of the institutional dummy variables DUM06_INSTI and 
DUM10_INSTI in the robustness check are the same as in Table 10. That is, only in the 
regression of BONUS and SALARY_BONUS, the coefficients are negative and significant. Even 
though we filter out the unclear impact of M&A transactions within one year immediately after 
the completions, large institutional shareholders still suggest their controlling of CEO 
overpayments in bonus and salary plus bonus. The reductions are stronger in firms with over 
10% institutional ownership. There is also no indication that large institutional investors monitor 
CEO equity compensation. 
Besides the level of compensations, the impact of concentrated institutional ownerships could 
also be reflected in pay-for-performance sensitivities. Whether CEO compensation received in 
M&A is tied to their short-term performance or not under different ownership structures is 
presented in Table 18 Panel B. The sign and the significance of the coefficients of CAR2 and 
interacted terms between CAR2 and institutional ownerships remain the same as in Table 11. In 
widely held firms, CEO cash compensation is not affected by their performance in M&A. In 
institution controlled firms, the relation is greatly improved. However, higher equity 
compensation does not come from good short-term performance in any groups of firms. 
The lack of significant association between the firm short-term performance and equity 
compensations does not necessarily mean that large institutional investors do not care about 
equity compensation or firms’ long-term development. However, Panel C suggests that equity 
compensations are not affected by post-merger long-term performance either. 
In the tests of CEO compensation and managerial power in Panel D, large institutional 
shareholders reduce the increases in CEOs bonus and salary plus bonus which are amplified from 
CEO duality. However, over the design of equity packages, they do not show any effort to 
influence CEOs who also serve as chairmen in the boards. 
In the logistic regressions presented in Panel E, the shift of CEO compensation structure is out 
of the control of large institutional ownership or the combination of the CEO power or their 
expectations of firm long-term performance.  
Institutional large shareholders can effectively control CEO cash compensation regarding the 
magnitude of the changes and the alignment between the increases in compensations and their 
performance, but there is no evidence to suggest that they control CEO equity compensation or 
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compensation structure.  
 
5.3.2 Compounding Effects 
Given that we are measuring returns over a 3-year period, perhaps a weakness of the 
LTRETURN calculation is that the returns are not compounded. This could lead to biased 
measurement (Barber & Lyon, 1997) when dividend payments change over time. As a robustness 
test, we use a monthly compounded holding period abnormal return (HPR) to measure the long 
term performance of a merger. Equation 5.7 is used for the computation of HPR: 
HPR = ∏(1+ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) −∏(1 + 𝑅𝑚,𝑡) 
5.7 
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly stock total return for individual firms i, and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the monthly stock 
total return for the value-weighted market index15. Again, we incorporate two time periods, the 
three-year immediately after the completion and the three-year starting one year after the 
completion. We denote the first by HPR and the second by HPR_1. 
The analysis using compounded holding period return generates results similar to those 
produced with simple returns. For brevity, we only present the coefficients of long-term 
performance in Tables 17.  
 [Insert Table 17] 
As shown in Tables 17, the new measures, HPR and HPR_1 are lower than LTRETURN and 
LTRETURN_1 respectively, but similar to LTRETURN and LTRETURN_1, HPR is smaller than 
HPR_1. Panel B suggests that HPR and HPR_1 do not change any relations between CEO 
compensation and the institutional ownership, the performance, or the managerial power. In the 
separate tests of long-term performance in widely held firms and institution controlled firms in 
Panel C and E, large institutional shareholders fail to show any control in pay-for-long-term 
performance.  
 
Note that HPR and HPR_1 are both cumulative abnormal returns over the relevant 3-year 
period. As robustness test, we use the geometric average return per month (GAR) over the 
relevant 3-year period. GAR is calculated as follows: 
                                                             
15 We also tested daily stock return and the results do not differ from each other. 
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GAR = √∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑡  - √∏(1 + 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
𝑡
 5.8 
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly stock total return for individual firms i, and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the monthly total 
return for the value-weighted market index.  The qualitative results remain unchanged.  
 
5.3.3 The Relative Size of Transaction 
Firm size could be expanded by acquiring other firms. The relative size of the M&A 
transactions reflects the rate of expansion. To account for the impact of enlarged firm size after 
M&A, we also incorporate the value of acquired target to the value of bidder in Table 18. 
[Insert Table 18] 
 Consistent with the literature, the new accumulated size boosts CEO bonus and salary plus 
bonus payments (Panel A to D). However, the value of the transaction does not alter our 
observation on the relationship between CEO compensation and institutional ownership. 
Institutional large shareholders reduce CEO cash compensation after M&A but enhance the 
relation with short-term performance at the same time. The F-test of institutional dummy 
variables and the interacted terms in Panel D suggests that rent extraction by powerful CEO is 
also mitigated in institution controlled firms. CEO equity compensation, however, is not 
controlled by institutional large shareholders. 
 
5.3.4 Alternative Institution Concentration 
    Compared with 6%, 5% is more accepted by most of the scholars when considering significant 
shareholding. While the argument for using 5% would be that SEC filing requires disclosure 5% 
or more holding by a single investor, we use 6% holding to indentify intense institutional 
ownership to avoid issues  associated with small sample size.  We re-estimate our regressions 
with the 5% definition and present the results in Table 19. 
[Insert Table 19] 
The firms in the braket of 5% to 10% institutional ownershil compensate their CEOs with 
$528.16 less in bonus and $550.577 less in salary plus bonus compared to firms with less than 
5% institutional ownership. The reduction in cash is larger than that in the 6% to 10% 
institutional ownership but still lower than in firms with over 10% institutional ownership. The 
cash payments increase with good short-term and long-term performance but decrease when 
CEO have too much controlling in institution controlled firms. No significant impact of 
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institutional ownership is shown on CEO equity compensation. 
 
5.3.5 The Change in Compensation 
The focus in the above analysis is the level and the structure of CEO compensation. A  higher 
level of compensation does not necessarily imply larger maganitude of change in compensation. 
Thus, in this section, we test the changes in compensation from one year prior to the 
compeletion, and the results are reported in Table 20. 
[Insert Table 20] 
The adjusted R-square sharply drops when we test the changes in CEO total and equity 
compensation in Panel A to D. The p values of the F-test of the regressions of the changes in 
CEO option and stock plus option grants are higher than 10% in Panle A, B, and D. Althought 
the regressions of the changes in total and equity compensation in Panel B is significant and the 
relationship between equity compensation and short-term performance is significantly changed 
in institution controlled firms, the adjusted R-squre is very low, suggesting that the fitness of the 
regressions is very poor. The effect of instituonal large shareholders’ monitoring on CEO cash 
compensation remains the same. While the level of cash is lower, the association between cash 
and performance is higher, and cash compensation that arises from CEO duality is lower in 
institution controlled firms. 
 
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter summarizes the motivations and the findings, considers the implications of the 
results for practitioners, academics, and policy makers, identifies the limitations, and 
recommends directions for future research. 
6.1 Motivations and Findings 
Previous studies, such as Girma et al. (2006), suggest that CEO compensation increases 
through M&A. However, only three papers directly investigate the reasons behind this increase. 
The US bidder CEOs use their influence over the board to extract rent in M&A, which supports 
the managerial power theory, while Australian CEOs are compensated for their effort to complete 
deals and their better performance during M&A announcements, which is consistent with the 
traditional theory of CEO compensation. Moreover, the UK CEOs compensation are less paid for 
their power in M&A than the compensation in US firms. 
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This study explores the nature and reasons behind compensation increases following mergers 
and acquisitions. We contribute to the literature in several directions. First, we investigate 
whether the increases in CEO compensation resulting from mergers and acquisitions are larger 
than what might be justified on the basis of bigger size and different firm specific circumstances 
and whether these changes are persistent over time. Second, we examine whether the post-
merger 3-year performance can explain some of the changes in CEO compensation. Third, we 
consider the impact of institutional investors on the size and structure of executive compensation 
following M&A.  These issues have not been addressed by previous studies. Our sample consists 
of 268 M&A events that took place in non-family firms during the period of 2001 to 2005 
inclusive. We compare the level of compensation in those 268 bidder firms with the non-M&A 
firms available in the Compustat during the sample period by controlling for firm characteristics 
and industries.  
Our analysis shows that the period of time is a matter of the changes in CEO compensation in 
the year of completing M&A. During our sample period, the transactions does not improve CEO 
total compensation, because only cash compensation grows after the completion of the deals. 
However, between 1993 and 2000, when there was a big M&A wave, bull stock market, and 
proliferation of option grants, both CEO cash and equity compensation increased following 
M&As. After 2000, the settled stock market and new accounting regulations made options less 
favorable to managers and firms. The market at the same time also stopped overpaying options. 
Therefore, the trend of the changes in CEO compensation differs between the two periods. 
Though there is no significant difference of CEO total compensation before and after the 
M&A, 266 bidder firms are shown when firms do not have large institutional shareholders, they 
compensate their CEOs much higher in M&A years than through internal growth conducted by 
the non-M&A firms in the same period. If firms have at least one large institutional shareholder, 
the increase in CEO cash compensation will be much lower. 
Large institutional shareholders also monitor CEO cash compensation by reducing the level of 
cash payments, enhancing the association with short term performance, and prohibiting cash 
extractions via managerial power. In institution controlled firms, the traditional theory explains 
CEO cash compensation in M&A, while in widely held firms, the managerial power theory is 
dominant, as managers are not rewarded or punished for their good or bad performance. 
However, we do not find any positive evidence that large institutional shareholders manage 
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CEO equity compensation in M&A. As our results indicate that firm long-term performance is 
not predictable from short-term performance in M&A, we infer that large institutional 
shareholders may not be able to forecast the impact of M&A in the long-term and thus adjust 
CEO equity compensation in the completion years, and the grants of equity compensation could 
be negotiated for multiple years. 
Though corporations which pay CEO more cash during M&A underperform those which 
substitute CEO partial cash payments with equity payments in both short-term and long-term, 
institutional ownership or mangers with substantial power do not seem to explain the changes in 
CEO compensation structure. Institutional shareholders’ lack of control of CEO compensation 
structure could be caused by the lack of ability to manage CEO equity compensation in M&A.  
Therefore, we show that in general the change in CEO compensation in M&A depends on the 
stock market, related regulations, and the shareholders’ understanding of compensation. CEO 
would get more payments from M&A than from internal growth, but large institutional 
shareholders would reduce the increases significantly. Large institutional shareholders are 
effective in preventing CEOs from expropriating more cash in M&A but they do not influence 
CEO equity compensation or compensation structure.  
 
6.2 Implications 
Our study contributes to both the theoretical research and the practical implements of CEO 
compensation. We complement the literature of the reasons behind the increases in CEO 
compensation through M&A by adding long-term post acquisition performance. Therefore, we 
are able to fully and deeply understand the properties of CEO compensation. Moreover, we also 
take in account the governance of institutional ownership to test the effectiveness of 
compensation as a monitoring devise. Another innovation is the investigation of the changes in 
CEO compensations structure in M&A and the comparison of the performance in different 
groups, which allows us to know the design of different forms of compensation and the whole 
compensation package. 
Empirically, our study could be a base for firms to re-exam the design and the control of their 
managers’ compensation contract. More effective monitoring mechanisms should be conducted 
to control the expropriations and unreasonable negotiations. The market policy makers should 
also pay attention to our findings before making any new regulations regarding compensation 
and related accounting standards to prevent mangers expropriating from investors. Shareholders 
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could also use our conclusions to make investment decisions to avoid managerial rent extraction. 
 
6.3 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Studies 
Despite the above implications, this thesis does not test multiple takeovers within our sample 
period nor does it compare the difference between single takeovers. We admit that the strategies 
and agency problems could vary in different types of M&As. Since we do not have the technique 
of distinguishing the impact of each event from a serial M&As on firms’ long-term performance, 
we leave this topic for future studies. Another aspect of the future investigation of the two 
compensation theories could be to look at the corporate governance among different institutional 
investors such as mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, and insurance companies. Because 
of the data unavailability, we are not able to split the institutional ownership into more detailed 
types. Future research could focus on the monitoring role of different institutional shareholders 
and the impact of such monitoring on CEO compensation in M&A. 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Summary of the variables and the construction 
Panel A. CEO compensation 
SALARY CEO annual base salary  
BONUS CEO annual bonus  
OTHANN CEO annual other payments 
STOCK CEO annual restricted stock granted 
OPTION CEO annual option granted under Black and Scholes' model 
LTIP CEO annual payments under company's long-term incentive plan 
ALLOTHTOT CEO all other compensation which cannot be attributed to any other types 
TOTAL The sum of the above seven CEO compensation components 
CASH_BASED_PAYMENT The sum of the salary, bonus, other payments 
EQYUITY_BASED_PAYMENT The sum of stock, option, and long-term incentive payments 
  Pane B Firm's characteristics   
SIZE The logarithm of the firm's total book value of asset at the beginning of the year 
ROA Return on asset 
RETURN Fiscal annually stock return 
SALES_GROWTH The growth rate of sales 
LEVERAGE The ratio of the total liability to total asset 
  
5
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 Panel C Firm performance 
CAR2 Announcement period abnormal return within announcement day and one day prior 
LTRETURN_ADJUSTED Long-term market adjusted return within 3 years starting from the completion date 
LTRETURN_ADJUSTED_1 Long-term market adjusted return within 3 years starting from one year after the completion date 
CTAR 3-year Calendar-time portfolio abnormal return under Fama-French model 
CTAR_1 3-year Calendar-time portfolio abnormal return under Fama-French model 
HPR 3-year market adjusted monthly holding-period-return staring from the first month after the completion 
HPR_1 3-year market adjusted monthly holding-period-return staring from the thirteenth month after the completion 
 
 Panel D Management efforts 
TRANSACTION_VALUE The value of the M&A deals 
TIME The logarithm of the number of days between announcement and completion 
DUM_DIVERSIFY Dummy variable which equals to 1 when the target and the bidder are not in the same industry 
DUM_SHAREONLY Dummy variable which indicates whether bidders pay targets with only shares 
 
 Panel D  Managerial power 
DUM_CHAIRMAN Dummy variable which indicates whether CEO also serve as a chairman 
TENURE The logarithm of the number of years of being CEO till the completion of M&A deals 
 
 Panel F Ownership structure 
DUM06_INSTI Dummy variable whether the biggest institutional shareholder owns between 6% to 10% of firms' total shares 
DUM10_INSTI Dummy variable whether the biggest institutional shareholder owns over  10% of firms' total shares 
 
5
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Table 1 Summary statistics and univariate tests of CEO compensation 
This table lists CEO compensation in 268 events from non-family bidding firms between 2001 and 2005 
inclusive. Panel A is the summary statistics of CEO compensation and components in completion years. 
Panel B compares CEO compensation and component in the completion year with one year prior. 
SALARY is CEO annual base salary. BONUS is CEO annual bonus. OTHANN is CEO annual other 
payment. STOCK is CEO annual restricted stock granted. OPTION is CEO option granted under Black 
and Scholes' model. LTIP represents CEO payment under the company's long-term incentive plan. 
ALLOTHTOT is CEO all other compensation which cannot be attributed to any other types. TOTAL is the 
sum of the above seven CEO compensation components. CASH_BASED_PAYMENT equals to the sum of 
the salary, bonus, and other payments, which are linked to firm performance in a short-term. 
EQYUITY_BASED_PAYMENT is the sum of stock, option, and long-term incentive payments, which are 
paid according to firm performance in a long-run. ***, **, and * indicate respectively significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Panel A: CEOs compensation in completion year (unit: thousands). 
  N Min Max Mean Std. Dev Median 
SALARY 268  0.000  2042.700  657.739  308.400  624.050  
BONUS 268  -0.001  6089.730  693.533  902.102  400.000  
OTHANN 268  0.000  2143.570  50.801  187.093  0.000  
STOCK 268  0.000  17900.000  435.310  1546.350  0.000  
OPTION 268  0.000  27277.470  2250.770  4022.440  723.780  
LTIP 268  0.000  4725.000  137.289  619.060  0.000  
ALLOTHTOT 268  0.000  5675.270  170.174  641.551  16.008  
TOTAL 268  110.500  32164.630  4395.610  5328.580  2622.440  
CASH_BASED_PAYMENT 268  0.000  10565.220  1572.250  1464.800  1134.650  
EQYUITY_BASED_PAYMENT 268  0.000  27277.470  2823.360  4572.610  1101.960  
 
Panel B: Univirate test of CEO compensations: The completion year (t=0) versus the year prior (t=-1) for the whole 
sample. N=268 
  
Mean 
(t=0) 
Mean(t=-1) diff-Mean t Sig.  diff-median 
SALARY 657.739  609.596  48.142*** 8.750  <.0001 45.300  
BONUS 693.533  573.378  120.155***  2.910  0.004  0.000  
OTHANN 50.801  42.557  8.244  1.440  0.151  0.000  
STOCK 435.310  429.871  5.439  0.040  0.966  0.000  
OPTION 2250.770  3246.830  -996.064***  -2.660  0.008  -326.141  
LTIP 137.289  79.614  57.674*  1.860  0.063  0.000  
ALLOTHTOT 170.174  65.691  104.483***  3.020  0.003  -1.062  
TOTAL 4395.610  5047.540  -651.927  -1.510  0.132  123.840  
CASH_BASED_PAYMENT 1572.250  1291.220  281.024***  4.930  <.0001 90.300  
EQYUITY_BASED_PAYMENT 2823.360  3756.320  -932.951**  -2.220  0.028  -62.540  
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Table 2 Univariate tests under different methodologies and different periods 
This table is univariate tests of CEO compensation and components under the sample selection criteria and 
sample period of Harford and Li (2007) and ours. The differences between Harford and Li’s and our filters 
are: 1.We test the mean of CEO compensation in and before M&A, while Harford and Li look at CEO 
compensation after and before M&A. 2. We require the market value of the transaction must be at least 5% 
of the bidders’ total market capital, whereas Harford and Li increase use 10%. 3. Our overlap cannot 
happen with 4 years while Harford and Li exclude the overlapped deals within 2 years. Panel A presents 
the replication of the study of Harford and Li (2007), which is from 1993 to 2000. Panel B is constructed 
under the same criteria as our sample, but with Harford and Li’s sample period, which is from 1993 to 
2000. Panel C presents another new group of CEO compensation which is selected under Harford and Li’s 
methodology but under our sample period, from 2001 to 2003. t0 is the year of completing the M&A 
transactions and t-1 is one year prior. SALARY, BONUS, OTHANN, STOCK, OPTION, LTIP, and 
ALLOTHTOT are seven components of CEO annual total compensation (TOTAL), which are base salary, 
bonus, annual other payments, restricted stock granted, option granted, long-term incentive payment, and 
all other compensation. CASH_BASED_PAYMENT equals to the sum of the salary, bonus, and other 
payments. EQYUITY_BASED_PAYMENT is the sum of stock, option, and long-term incentive payments. 
***, **, and * indicate respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 2 Univariate tests under different methodologies and different periods 
Panel A Univariate test of CEO compensation in one year after the completion (t=1) and in one year before the 
announcement (t=-1) from the replication of Harford and Li (2007) (from year 1993 to 2000). N=283 
  Mean(t=1) Mean(t=-1) diff-Mean t Sig.  diff-median 
SALARY 637.76 539.988 97.773*** 15.11 0 83.666 
BONUS 758.21 612.916 145.293** 2.156 0.032 77.96 
OTHANN 151.594 29.468 122.126 1.048 0.296 0 
STOCK 239.473 206.199 33.273 0.28 0.78 0 
OPTION 3099.609 1274.641 1839.833*** 3.011 0.003 181.9855 
LTIP 227.986 126.905 101.082 1.096 0.274 0 
ALLOTHTOT 147.687 66.701 80.985** 2.011 0.045 0 
TOTAL 5262.319 2860.497 2426.103*** 3.624 0 573.9615 
CASH_BASED_PAYMENT 1695.251 1249.073 446.178** 2.243 0.026 180.045 
EQYUITY_BASED_PAYMENT 3567.068 1607.443 1977.684*** 3.214 0.001 305.684 
 
Panel B Univariate test of CEO compensations in one year after the completion (t=1) and in one year before the 
announcement (t=-1) from 1993 to 2000 under our methodology. N=315 
  Mean(t=0) Mean(t=-1) diff-Mean t Sig.  diff-median 
SALARY 575.69 531.737 43.954*** 8.731 0 30.6 
BONUS 550.968 504.898 46.07 1.412 0.159 50 
OTHANN 41.796 36.772 5.025 0.543 0.588 0 
STOCK 240.483 166.626 73.857 1.047 0.296 0 
OPTION 3182.93 1970.841 1212.089*** 3.336 0.001 126.398 
LTIP 194.887 174.827 20.06 0.329 0.742 0 
ALLOTHTOT 136.5 146.394 -9.893 -0.229 0.819 0 
TOTAL 4923.254 3532.093 1391.161*** 3.792 0 219.941 
CASH_BASED_PAYMENT 1304.955 1219.8 85.155 1.623 0.106 98.384 
EQYUITY_BASED_PAYMENT 3618.3 2312.294 1306.006*** 3.595 0 154.846 
 
Panel C Univariate test of CEO compensations in completion year (t=0) and in one year before (t=-1) from 2001 to 2005 
under Harford and Li’s methodology. N=217 
  Mean(t=1) Mean(t=-1) diff-Mean t Sig.  diff-median 
SALARY 757.462 629.068 128.394*** 7.156 0 76.923 
BONUS 672.553 749.679 -77.127 -0.784 0.434 0 
OTHANN 60.666 44.117 22.938*** 2.61 0.01 0 
STOCK 944.39 366.087 721.106** 2.552 0.012 0 
OPTION 2457.26 3024.9 -610.971 -0.747 0.456 -32.708 
LTIP 355.92 175.907 175.035** 2.14 0.034 0 
ALLOTHTOT 186.67 78.027 109.835* 1.958 0.052 0 
TOTAL 5617.612 5067.734 556.683 0.88 0.38 287.143 
CASH_BASED_PAYMENT 1744.838 1500.892 307.855*** 2.362 0.019 160.374 
EQYUITY_BASED_PAYMENT 3757.57 3569.403 289.911 0.427 0.67 0 
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Table 3 Statistics Summary Tables of Explanatory Variables 
This table describes the statistics of major explanatory variables of 268 events from non-family bidding 
firms from 2001 to 2005. Those explanatory variables are categorized into five groups, which are 
illustrated in the following 5 panels. Panel A is the firm level characteristics for non-family bidding firms. 
SIZE refers to the book value of the total assets in bidding firms in the beginning of the completion years. 
ROA is computed by the annual earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 
over total assets. RETURN is the total gross stock return during the completion years. SALE_GROWTH is 
the growth rate of sales, which is equal to the sales in completion years divided by the sales one year prior. 
LEVERAGE is the total liability to total asset. Panel B addresses the firm performance in M&A. CAR2 is 
the announcement period cumulative abnormal return within announcement day and one day prior under 
the market model. LTRETURN and LTRETURN_1 are both 3-year post-acquisition performance. They are 
the market adjusted monthly average stock total return. The former one starts from the first month after the 
completion, while the latter one starts from the 13
th
 month after the completion. CTAR and CTAR_1 are 
the calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns under Fama-French model, from the 1
st
 month to the 36
th
 
month and from the 13
th
 month to the 48
th
 month respectively. Panel C is about deal level characteristics. 
TRANSACTION_VALUE is the market value of the transaction. TIME is the number of days between the 
announcement date and the effective date. DUM_DIVERSIFY identifies whether the target’s SIC is the 
same as the bidder’s SIC. DUM_SHAREONLY is equal to 1 when the bidder pays the target with only 
shares. Panel D is about managerial power. DUM_CHAIRMAN indicates CEO duality. TENURE is the 
number of years when CEO works in the firm. Panel E presents institutional ownerships. DUM06_INSTI 
is equal to 1 when the firm’s largest institutional investor, if have any, has 6% to10% of the firm’s total 
shares. DUM10_INSTI is equal to 1 when the firm’s largest institutional investor, if have any, has more 
than 10% of the firm’s total shares. ***, **, and * indicate respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels. 
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Table 3 Statistics Summary Tables of Explanatory Variables 
Panel A Statistical summary table of the bidder firms characteristics 
 
N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
SIZE 268  7.611  93208.000  3244.400  8989.490  
ROA 266  -0.431  0.470  0.112  0.105  
RETURN 268  -0.885  1.754  0.037  0.450  
SALE_GROWTH 268  0.005  2.846  1.179  0.340  
LEVERAGE 267  0.052  1.119  0.480  0.191  
 
Panel B Statistical summary table of firm performance 
 
N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
CAR2 259  -0.225  0.405  -0.004  0.062  
LTRETURN 263  -1.003  6.044  0.099*  0.824  
LTRETURN _1 257  -1.254  4.220  0.168***  0.842  
CTAR 264  -0.275  0.097  0.000  0.027  
CTAR_1 254  -0.100  0.215  0.003*  0.026  
 
Panel C Statistical summary table of deal characteristics 
 
N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
TRANSACTION_VALUE 268  3.500  59515.020  1198.850  4965.550  
TIME 268  0  486.000  74.067  79.355  
DUM_DIVERSIFYIFY 268  0  1  0.556  0.498  
DUM_SHAREONLY 268  0  1  0.090  0.286  
 
Panel D Statistical summary table of managerial power 
 
N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
DUM_CHAIRMAN 268  0 1  0.653  0.477  
TENURE 266  0 41  7.624  6.605  
 
Panel E Statistical summary table of ownership structure 
 
N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
DUM06_INSTI 268  0  1  0.381  0.486  
DUM10_INSTI 268  0  1  0.455  0.499  
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Table 4 Comparison of explanatory variables among cash, neutral, and equity groups 
This table presents the explanatory variables among CASH, NEUTRAL, and EQUITY groups. We base on 
the changes in the percentages of CEO cash and equity compensations before and after M&A to divide our 
sample. In the CASH group, the ratio of CEO cash-based-compensation to total compensation increases by 
at least 5% between one year prior and the completion year. In the NEUTRAL group, the change in the 
percentage of CEO cash-based-compensation or equity-based-compensation from one year before M&A to 
completion year is less than 5%. In the EQUITY group, the percent of CEO equity-based-compensation 
out of total compensation in the completion year is at least 5% higher than one year prior. In Panel A, SIZE 
is the book value of total assets in the beginning of the completion years. ROA is return on assets. 
RETURN is the completion year gross stock return. SALE_GROWTH is the growth rate of the sale. 
LEVERAGE is the total liability to total asset. In Panel B, CAR2 is the announcement period cumulative 
abnormal return within announcement day and one day prior under the market model. LTRETURN and 
LTRETURN_1 are both 3-year market-adjusted monthly average stock returns starts from the first month 
after the completion and starts from the 13
th
 month after the completion respectively. CTAR and CTAR_1 
are the calendar-time portfolio abnormal return under Fama-French model, from the 1
st
 month to the 36
th
 
month and from the 13
th
 month to the 48
th
 month respectively. In panel C, TRANSACTION_VALUE is the 
market value of the transaction. TIME is the number of days between the announcement date and the 
effective date. DUM_DIVERSIFY identifies whether the target and bidder are in the same industry. 
DUM_SHAREONLY is equal to 1 when the bidder pays the target with only shares. In Panel D, 
DUM_CHAIRMAN indicates CEO duality. TENURE is the number of years when CEO works in the 
firms. In Panel E, DUM06_INSTI is equal to 1 when the firm’s largest institutional investor, if have any, 
has 6% to10% of the firm’s total shares. DUM10_INSTI is equal to 1 when the firm’s largest institutional 
investor, if have any, has more than 10% of the firm’s total shares. ***, **, and * indicate respectively 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 4 Comparison of explanatory variables among cash, neutral, and equity groups 
Panel A The comparison of firms’ characteristics among cash, neutral, and equity group 
  CASH NEUTRAL EQUITY 
SIZE 3182.96 3428.19 3154.01 
ROA 0.094 0.129 0.115 
RETURN 0.029 0.027 0.055 
SALES_GROWTH 1.133 1.23 1.184 
LEVERAGE 0.456 0.48 0.505 
N 98 78 92 
 
Panel B The comparison of firms’ performance among cash, neutral, and equity group 
  CASH NEUTRAL EQUITY 
CAR2 0.001  -0.016**  0.001  
LTRETURN 0.104  0.038  0.144**  
LTRETURN _1 0.084  0.128  0.293***  
CTAR -0.001  -0.002  0.003*  
CTAR_1 -0.001  0.001  0.009***  
 
Panel C The comparison of deals characteristics among cash, neutral, and equity group 
  CASH NEUTRAL EQUITY 
TRANSACTION_VALUE 1533.440  1336.600  725.654  
TIME 69.418  78.705  75.087  
DUM_DIVERSIFYIFY=1 0.561  0.551  0.554  
DUM_SHAREONLY 0.071  0.115  0.087  
 
Panel D. The comparison of managerial power among cash, neutral, and equity group 
  CASH NEUTRAL EQUITY 
DUM_CHAIRMAN 0.663  0.692  0.609  
TENURE 5.990  9.792  7.533  
 
Panel E. The comparison of ownership structure among cash, neutral, and equity group 
  CASH NEUTRAL EQUITY 
DUM06_INSTI 0.388  0.372  0.380  
DUM10_INSTI 0.449  0.462  0.457  
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Table 5 Comparison of CEO compensation among different ownerships 
This table compares CEO compensation and components in dispersed ownership, 6%-10% institutional 
ownership, and 10% plus institutional ownership. If the firm does not have any institutional shareholders 
or the largest institutional shareholder owns no more than 6% of the firm’s total shares, then it is in the 
NON-INSTI group. In the DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI group, the firm’s largest institutional 
shareholder owns 6% to 10% and more 10% plus of the firm’s total outstanding shares. SALARY, 
BONUS, OTHANN, STOCK, OPTION, LTIP, and ALLOTHTOT are seven components of CEO annual 
total compensation (TOTAL), which are base salary, bonus, annual other payments, restricted stock 
granted, option granted, long-term incentive payment, and all other compensation. 
CASH_BASED_PAYMENT equals to the sum of the salary, bonus, and other payments. 
EQYUITY_BASED_PAYMENT is the sum of stock, option, and long-term incentive payments. ***, **, 
and * indicate respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Panel A Comparison of the level of CEO compensation in completion year among widely held, 6% to 10% institution 
controlled, and 10% plus institution controlled group 
  Non_insti DUM06_INSTI DUM10_INSTI 
SALARY 703.511 648.461 648.987 
BONUS 1094.81 672.965 566.008 
OTHANN 80 49.048 41.736 
STOCK 293.327 571.645 372.532 
OPTION 2543.36 2162.11 2219.36 
LTIP 287.182 164.608 60.388 
ALLOTHTOT 242.092 194.287 124.076 
TOTAL 5244.28 4463.12 4033.09 
CASH_BASED_PAYMENT 2120.41 1564.76 1380.81 
EQYUITY_BASED_PAYMENT 3123.87 2898.36 2652.28 
N 44 102 122 
 
Panel B The difference in means of CEO compensation between the completion year and one year before in widely held 
group. N=44 
  mean(t=1) mean(t=0) diff t sig 
SALARY 703.511 664.94 38.571***  3.37 0.002 
BONUS 1094.81 660.574 434.231***  2.99 0.005 
OTHANN 80 53.378 26.622*  1.92 0.061 
STOCK 293.327 482.418 -189.091 -0.55 0.585 
OPTION 2543.36 5152.02 -2608.660*  -1.71 0.094 
LTIP 287.182 179.8 107.382 1.09 0.281 
ALLOTHTOT 242.092 110.648 131.444 1.23 0.226 
TOTAL 5244.28 7303.78 -2059.5 -1.11 0.274 
CASH_BASED_PAYMENT 2120.41 1489.54 630.869***  3.28 0.002 
EQYUITY_BASED_PAYMENT 3123.87 5814.24 -2690.37 -1.46 0.153 
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Panel C The difference in means of CEO compensation between the completion year and one year before in the 6% to 10% 
institution controlled group. N=102 
  mean(t=1) mean(t=0) diff t sig 
SALARY 648.461  600.768  47.693***  6.570  <.0001 
BONUS 672.965  522.968  149.997**  2.300  0.023  
OTHANN 49.048  42.100  6.948  1.050  0.299  
STOCK 571.645  359.516  212.128  1.020  0.312  
OPTION 2162.110  2818.870  -656.756  -1.400  0.164  
LTIP 164.608  84.259  80.349  1.430  0.156  
ALLOTHTOT 194.287  48.513  145.774**  2.240  0.028  
TOTAL 4463.120  4476.990  -13.866  -0.020  0.981  
CASH_BASED_PAYMENT 1564.760  1214.350  350.412***  3.610  0.001  
EQYUITY_BASED_PAYMENT 2898.360  3262.640  -364.278  -0.680  0.499  
 
Panel D The difference in means of CEO compensation in the completion year and one year before in the 10%  plus 
institution controlled group. N=122 
  mean(t=1) mean(t=0) diff t sig 
SALARY 648.987  597.018  51.970***  5.390  <.0001 
BONUS 566.008  584.076  -18.068  -0.390  0.698  
OTHANN 41.736  39.037  2.698  0.270  0.790  
STOCK 372.532  469.740  -97.208  -0.520  0.602  
OPTION 2219.360  2917.520  -698.157  -1.500  0.137  
LTIP 60.388  39.598  20.789  0.610  0.545  
ALLOTHTOT 124.076  63.839  60.237  1.650  0.101  
TOTAL 4033.090  4710.830  -677.738  -1.420  0.157  
CASH_BASED_PAYMENT 1380.810  1283.970  96.837  1.580  0.116  
EQYUITY_BASED_PAYMENT 2652.280  3426.860  -774.575*  -1.700  0.093  
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Table 6 Comparison of the explanatory variables among different ownerships 
This table compares the explanatory variables in dispersed ownership, 6%-10% institutional ownership, 
and 10% plus institutional ownership. The firm with dispersed ownership is in the NON-INSTI group. In 
the DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI group include the firms with 6%-10% and 10% plus institutional 
ownership. SIZE is the book value of total assets in the beginning of the completion years. ROA is return 
on assets. RETURN is the completion year gross stock return. SALE_GROWTH is the growth rate of the 
sale. LEVERAGE is the total liability to total asset. CAR2 is the announcement period cumulative 
abnormal return in (-1, 0). LTRETURN and LTRETURN_1 are 3-year market-adjusted monthly average 
stock returns in (1, 36) and (13, 48). CTAR and CTAR_1 are the calendar-time monthly portfolio abnormal 
return under Fama-French model in (1, 36) and (13, 48). TRANSACTION_VALUE is the market value of 
the transaction. TIME is the number of days to complete. DUM_DIVERSIFY identifies diversification in 
M&A. DUM_SHAREONLY is the indicator of 100% share financing in M&A. DUM_CHAIRMAN 
indicates CEO duality. TENURE is the number of years when CEO works in the firms. ***, **, and * 
indicate respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Panel A The comparison of firms’ characteristics among non-institution, 6% to 10% institution, and 10% plus institution 
controlled groups. 
  NON_INSTI DUM06_INSTI DUM10_INSTI 
SIZE 7805.79 2771.82 1994.41 
ROA 0.109 0.107 0.116 
RETURN 0.046 0.083 -0.004 
SALES_GROWTH 1.201 1.167 1.181 
LEVERAGE 0.47 0.481 0.483 
N 43 102 122 
 
Panel B The comparison of firms’ performance among non-institution, 6% to 10% institution, and 10% plus institution 
controlled groups. 
  NON_INSTI DUM06_INSTI DUM10_INSTI 
CAR2 -0.006 0 -0.006 
LTRETURN 0.11 0.097 0.096 
LTRETURN _1 0.263 0.095 0.194***  
CTAR 0.006**  -0.002 0.001 
CTAR_1 0.001 0.002 0.005 
 
Panel C The comparison of managerial efforts among non-institution, 6% to 10% institution, and 10% plus institution 
controlled groups. 
  NON_INSTI DUM06_INSTI DUM10_INSTI 
TRANSACTION_VALUE 3561.99 963.064 543.707 
TIME 89.636 73.245 69.139 
DUM_DIVERSIFYIFY=1 0.523 0.5 0.615 
DUM_SHAREONLY 0.159 0.069 0.082 
 
Panel D The comparison of managerial power among non-institution, 6% to 10% institution, and 10% plus institution 
controlled groups. 
  NON_INSTI DUM06_INSTI DUM10_INSTI 
DUM_CHAIRMAN 0.636 0.627 0.68 
TENURE 8.047 7.525 7.557 
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Table 7 The Pearson correlation coefficients of explanatory variables in Model 5.1 
The table presents the correlation coefficients of explanatory variables in Model 5.1. This table includes 
not only 268 events from non-family bidding firm from 2001 to 2005 but also firms which are available in 
the Compustat database without M&A between 2001 and 2005. Therefore, we have 3816 observations 
here. SIZE is the book value of total asset in the beginning of the completion years. ROA is return on 
assets. ROA_GROWTH is the growth rate of ROA. RETURN is the completion year gross stock return. 
SALE_GROWTH is the growth rate of the sale. MTBV is the market to book ratio. LEVERAGE is the 
total liability to total asset. ***, **, and * indicate respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  SIZE ROA 
ROA_ 
RETURN 
SALES_ 
MTBV 
LEVERAG
E GROWTH GROWTH 
SIZE 1 
       
  
        
ROA 0.013 1 
      
  (-0.412) 
       
ROA_GROWTH 0.004 0.005 1 
   
  
  (-0.818) (-0.747) 
      
RETURN -0.007 0.050***  0.002 1 
    
  (-0.667) (-0.002) (-0.883) 
     
SALES_GROWT
H 
0.011 -0.011 0.000 -0.016 1 
   
 
(-0.491) (-0.492) (-0.997) (-0.338) 
    
MTBV 0.004 0.124***  0.000 0.055***  -0.001 1   
  (-0.813) (<.0001) (-0.993) (-0.001) (-0.969) 
   
LEVERAGE 0.044***  -0.366***  0.010  -0.040**  0.010  -0.019  1 
  (0.006)  (<.0001) (0.527)  (0.015)  (0.536)  (0.233)    
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Table 8 The regression of CEO compensation and components in Model 5.1 
This table includes 3816 observations, 268 of which are from bidding firms while the rest of which are 
from non-M&A firms in the Compustat from 2001 to 2005. The regressions test the growth in CEO 
compensation in M&A compared with internal growth. SIZE is the book value of total asset in the 
beginning of the completion years. ROA is return on assets. ROA_GROWTH is the growth rate of ROA. 
RETURN is the completion year gross stock return. SALE_GROWTH is the growth rate of the sale. 
MTBV is the market to book ratio. LEVERAGE is the total liability to total asset. DUM_MA is the M&A 
dummy variable. DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI are the indicators of 6%-10% and 10% plus 
institutional ownerships. DUM06_INSTI_MA and DUM10_INSTI_MA are the products of institutional 
ownership dummies, DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI, with M&A dummy, DUM_MA. ***, **, and * 
indicate respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTIO
N 
INTERCEPT 1309.717 
(0.810)  
38.822 
(0.140)   
479.988 
(1.490)  
300.569 
(0.230)  
158.327 
(0.110)  
SIZE 0.110*** 
(17.730)  
0.013*** 
(11.730)  
0.019*** 
(15.040)  
0.045*** 
(8.920)  
0.077*** 
(13.860)  
ROA 4399.190*** 
(6.250)  
818.682*** 
(6.720)  
1108.600*** 
(7.910)  
2165.712*** 
(3.770)  
2888.453*** 
(4.560)  
ROA_GROWTH 0.030 
(0.040)  
0.036 
(0.310) 
0.052 
(0.390)  
-0.050 
(-0.090)  
-0.032 
(-0.050)  
SALES_GROWTH 1016.950*** 
(2.950)  
195.038*** 
(3.260)  
147.888** 
(2.150)  
760.978*** 
(2.710)  
868.715*** 
(2.800)  
RETURN 7.746*** 
(3.130)  
0.810* 
(1.880)  
1.130** 
(2.280)  
2.165 
(1.070)  
6.719*** 
(3.010)  
MTBV 3.795 
(0.840)  
0.783 
(1.000)  
0.925 
(1.020)  
2.696 
(0.730)  
3.929 
(0.960)  
LEVERAGE 365.078** 
(2.120)  
98.029*** 
(3.280)  
146.095*** 
(4.250)  
70.474 
(0.500)  
160.876 
(1.040)  
DUM_MA 1228.138** 
(2.370)  
411.752*** 
(4.580)  
488.023*** 
(4.720)  
824.738* 
(1.950)  
672.853 
(1.440)  
DUM06_INSTI -134.799 
(-0.390)  
-35.130 
(-0.590)  
-62.170 
(-0.900)  
-54.507 
(-0.190)  
1.734 
(0.010)  
DUM10_INSTI -166.199 
(-0.480)  
-87.435 
(-1.470)  
-104.608 
(-1.530)  
45.735 
(0.160)  
62.939 
(0.200)  
DUM06_INSTI_MA -306.528 
(-0.500)  
-451.770*** 
(-4.260)  
-495.172*** 
(-4.050)  
39.314 
(0.080)  
300.798 
(0.550)  
DUM10_INSTI_MA -712.771 
(-1.170)  
-337.314*** 
(-3.180)  
-380.232*** 
(-3.110)  
-514.770 
(-1.030)  
-235.873 
(-0.430)  
YEAR & INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.1646 0.4033 0.3933 0.0499 0.0856 
N 
3759 3781 3781 3759 3759 
 
 
Table 9 The Pearson correlation coefficients of explanatory variables in Model 5.2 and Model 5.3 
This table discloses the correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables of 268 events from non-family bidding firms between 2001 and 2005 inclusive. 
SIZE is the book value of total assets in the beginning of the completion years. ROA is return on assets. RETURN is the completion year gross stock return. 
SALE_GROWTH is the growth rate of the sale. LEVERAGE is the total liability to total asset.  CAR2 is the announcement period cumulative abnormal return in (-
1,0). LTRETURN is 3-year market-adjusted monthly average stock return in (1, 36). TIME is the number of days to complete. DUM_DIVERSIFY identifies 
diversification in M&A. DUM_SHAREONLY is the indicator of 100% share financing in M&A. DUM_CHAIRMAN indicates CEO duality. TENURE is the 
number of years when CEO works in the firms. ***, **, and * indicate respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 9 The Pearson correlation coefficients of explanatory variable in Model 5.2 and Model 5.3 
        SALES_ LEVER    LTRE    DUM_DI DUM_SHA DUM_CH TEN  
  SIZE ROA RETURN GROWTH -AGE CAR2 -TURN TIME -VERSIFY -REONLY -AIRMAN -URE 
SIZE 1 
          
  
             
ROA 0.161***  1 
       
 
 
  
  (0.009) 
        
 
 
  
RETURN 0.062 0.303***  1 
 
     
 
 
  
  (0.313) (<.0001) 
       
 
 
  
SALES_ GROWTH 0.108* 0.411*** 0.225*** 1 
     
 
 
  
 
(0.079) (<.0001) (0.000) 
      
 
 
  
LEVERAGE 0.380***  0.109*  0.054 0.012 1 
    
 
 
  
  (<.0001) (0.076) (0.382) (0.839) 
     
 
 
  
CAR2 -0.153**  0.124**  0.079 0.058 0.052 1 
   
 
 
  
  (0.014) (0.048) (0.204) (0.356) (0.406) 
    
 
 
  
LTRETURN 0.108*  0.045 0.169***  0.087 0.113*  -0.012 1 
  
 
 
  
  (0.082) (0.472) (0.006) (0.160) (0.067) (0.851) 
   
 
 
  
TIME 0.014 0.003 -0.033 0.212*** 0.132**  0.027 0.474***  1 
 
 
 
  
  (0.829) (0.959) (0.599) (0.001) (0.034) (0.664) (<.0001) 
  
 
 
  
DUM_ DIVERSIFY 0.261***  -0.025 0.090 -0.079 0.107*  -0.095 0.008 -0.015 1 
 
 
  
  (<.0001) (0.689) (0.140) (0.196) (0.080) (0.127) (0.892) (0.808) 
 
 
 
  
DUM_ 
SHAREONLY 
-0.081 -0.226***  -0.148**  0.094 -0.253***  -0.256***  -0.113*  -0.069 0.172***  1 
 
  
 
(0.184) (0.000) (0.016) (0.126) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.068) (0.268) (0.005) 
  
  
DUM_ 
CHAIRMAN 
0.133**  -0.061 -0.007 0.085 0.027 -0.005 -0.030 -0.073 0.129**  -0.047 1   
  (0.032) (0.332) (0.908) (0.164) (0.668) (0.936) (0.628) (0.249) (0.037) (0.452) 
 
  
TENURE -0.168*** 0.045 -0.076 -0.011 -0.016 0.025 -0.120*  -0.247*** 0.001 0.014 0.267*** 1 
  (0.006) (0.466) (0.219) (0.862) (0.794) (0.697) (0.053) (<.0001) (0.993) (0.816) (<.0001)   
7
8
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Table 10 The regression of CEO compensation in the completion year in Model 5.2 
The regressions in this table include all 268 events from non-family bidding firms from 2001 to 2005. This 
table shows the impact of institutional ownership on the level of CEO compensation in M&A as well as the 
driven factors of CEO compensation in M&A after controlling for firms’ characteristics. The dependent 
variables in the five columns are CEO total compensation, bonus, salary plus bonus, option grants, and 
restricted stock grants plus stock option grants. SIZE is the book value of total assets in the beginning of the 
completion years. ROA is return on assets. RETURN is the completion year gross stock return. 
SALE_GROWTH is the growth rate of the sale. LEVERAGE is the total liability to total asset. CAR2 is the 
announcement period cumulative abnormal return in (-1, 0). LTRETURN is 3-year market-adjusted monthly 
average stock return in (1, 36). TIME is the number of days to complete. DUM_DIVERSIFY identifies 
diversification in M&A. DUM_SHAREONLY is the indicator of 100% share financing in M&A. TENURE is 
the number of years when CEO works in the firms. DUM_CHAIRMAN indicates CEO duality. 
DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI are the indicators of 6%-10% and 10% plus institutional ownerships. ***, 
**, and * indicate respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
INTERCEPT -12501.000*** 
(-3.780)  
-1865.791*** 
(-3.460)  
-2562.251*** 
(-4.090)  
-5959.484** 
(-2.230)  
-8214.501*** 
(-2.790)  
SIZE 2126.594*** 
(8.390)  
353.365*** 
(8.560)  
506.203*** 
(10.540)  
1074.898*** 
(5.240)  
1405.062*** 
(6.210)  
ROA 2343.131 
(0.680)   
-29.660 
(-0.050)  
216.632 
(0.330)  
1044.223 
(0.370)  
1900.930 
(0.610)  
RETURN -212.682 
(-0.290)  
92.744 
(0.780)  
93.957 
(0.680)  
-937.151 
(-1.580)  
-500.060 
(-0.760)  
SALES_GROWTH 64.088 
(0.060)  
119.848 
(0.730)  
14.672 
(0.080)  
909.501 
(1.110)  
299.303 
(0.330)  
LEVERAGE -944.422 
(-0.580)  
-59.289 
(-0.220)  
-6.694 
(-0.020)  
-782.356 
(-0.590)  
-1044.781 
(-0.720)  
CAR2 -2599.609 
(-0.560)  
205.655 
(0.270)  
338.256 
(0.380)  
-4097.711 
(-1.090)  
-2840.012 
(-0.690)  
LTRETURN -70.872 
(-0.210)  
26.771 
(0.480)  
4.203 
(0.060)  
-121.688 
(-0.440)  
-98.015 
(-0.320)  
TIME 331.940 
(1.490)  
61.202* 
(1.680)  
73.147* 
(1.730)  
133.597 
(0.740)  
202.380 
(1.020)  
DUM_DIVERSIFY -596.158 
(-0.990)  
177.211* 
(1.810)  
168.825 
(1.490)  
-994.169** 
(-2.050)  
-710.759 
(-1.330)  
DUM_SHAREONLY 2108.959* 
(1.860)  
286.063 
(1.550)   
324.046 
(1.510)  
1230.807 
(1.340)  
1720.598* 
(1.700)  
TENURE -312.119 
(-0.710)  
-48.107 
(-0.670)  
-19.495 
(-0.240)  
-284.133 
(-0.800)  
-404.997 
(-1.040)  
DUM_CHAIRMAN 113.344 
(0.180)  
165.456 
(1.610)  
254.476** 
(2.130)  
233.165 
(0.460)  
-128.717 
(-0.230)  
DUM06_INSTI 144.354 
(0.170)  
-319.799** 
(-2.370)  
-318.297** 
(-2.030)  
358.957 
0.540)  
568.750 
(0.770)  
DUM10_INSTI -429.404 
(-0.530)  
-431.770*** 
-3.270)  
-414.023*** 
(-2.700)  
-5.470 
(-0.010)  
171.579 
(0.240)  
YEAR & INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.3406 0.4208 0.5006 0.2016 0.2231 
N 
253 253 253 253 253 
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Table 11 The regression of CEO compensation in the completion year on short-term 
performance in Model 5.3-A 
The regressions in this table include all 268 events from non-family bidding firms from 2001 to 2005. This 
table shows whether firm short-term performance is a determinant of CEO compensation in different 
ownership firms. The dependent variables in the five columns are CEO total compensation, bonus, salary plus 
bonus, option grants, and restricted stock grants plus stock option grants. SIZE is the book value of total assets 
in the beginning of the completion years. ROA is return on assets. RETURN is the completion year gross stock 
return. SALE_GROWTH is the growth rate of the sale. LEVERAGE is the total liability to total asset. CAR2 
is the announcement period cumulative abnormal return in (-1, 0). LTRETURN is 3-year market-adjusted 
monthly average stock return in (1, 36). TIME is the number of days to complete. DUM_DIVERSIFY 
identifies diversification in M&A. DUM_SHAREONLY is the indicator of 100% share financing in M&A. 
TENURE is the number of years when CEO works in the firms. DUM_CHAIRMAN indicates CEO duality. 
DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI are the indicators of 6%-10% and 10% plus institutional ownerships. 
CAR2_DUM06 and CAR2_DUM10 are the interactions of CAR2 with DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. 
***, **, and * indicate respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
INTERCEPT -12433.000*** 
(-3.760) 
-1843.806*** 
(-3.450)  
-2536.564*** 
(-4.080)  
-5910.373***  
(-2.210) 
-8185.645*** 
(-2.770) 
SIZE 2098.769*** 
(8.240) 
346.376*** 
(8.430)  
497.959*** 
(10.420)  
1052.405*** 
(5.100)  
1392.065*** 
(-2.770)  
ROA 2493.671  
(0.720) 
30.313  
(0.050) 
38.466  
(0.200) 
968.861 
(1.180)  
333.729 
(0.370)  
RETURN -297.375  
(-0.400) 
66.427  
(0.560) 
63.164 
(0.460)  
-999.728* 
(-1.670)  
-536.707 
(-0.810)  
SALES_GROWTH 139.407  
(0.140) 
140.076 
(0.860)  
286.278  
(0.440) 
1140.037 
(0.410)  
1958.445 
(0.630)  
LEVERAGE -750.402  
(-0.460) 
-8.169  
(-0.030) 
53.485  
(0.170) 
-628.292 
(-0.470)  
-955.529 
(-0.650)  
CAR2 -14874.000  
(-1.430) 
-3322.916** 
(-1.980)  
-3801.784* 
(-1.950)  
-13501.000 
(-1.600)  
-8316.367 
(-0.890)  
LTRETURN -63.982  
(-0.190) 
27.987  
(0.500) 
5.662 
(0.090)  
-115.516 
(-0.410)   
-94.498 
(-0.310)  
TIME 312.141  
(1.390) 
56.441  
(1.560) 
67.521  
(1.610) 
117.342 
(0.650)  
193.009 
(0.960)  
DUM_DIVERSIFY -584.904  
(-0.970) 
180.470* 
(1.860) 
172.648 
(1.530)  
-985.576** 
(-2.030)  
-705.752 
(-1.310)  
DUM_SHAREONLY 2155.990* 
(1.900) 
301.716 
(1.650)  
342.320 
(1.610)  
1264.341 
(1.380)  
1740.347* 
(1.720) 
TENURE -280.004  
(-0.640) 
-42.863 
-0.600)  
-13.171  
(-0.160) 
-254.872 
(-0.720)  
-388.364 
(-0.990)  
DUM_CHAIRMAN 83.562  
(0.130) 
159.499 
(1.570)   
247.374** 
(2.090) 
207.308 
(0.410)  
-143.510 
(-0.250)  
DUM06_INSTI 221.024  
(0.270) 
-297.945** 
(-2.220)  
-292.648*  
(-1.880) 
417.908 
(0.620)  
603.064 
(0.810)  
DUM10_INSTI -355.552  
(-0.440) 
-411.925*** 
(-3.140)  
-390.679** 
(-2.560)  
52.722 
(0.080)  
205.329 
(0.280)  
CAR2_DUM06 14520.000 
(1.060)  
5075.796** 
(2.290)  
5916.491** 
(2.300)  
10069.000 
(0.910)  
5956.759 
(0.490)  
CAR2_DUM10 15215.000  
(1.290) 
3983.014** 
(2.090)  
4690.087** 
(2.110)  
12112.000 
(1.260)  
7013.978 
(0.660)  
YEAR & INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.3399 0.4306 0.5093 0.2002 0.2178 
N 
253 253 253 253 253 
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Table 12 The regression of CEO compensation in the completion year on long-term 
performance in Model 5.3-B 
The regressions in this table include all 268 events from non-family bidding firms from 2001 to 2005. This 
table shows whether firm long-term performance is a determinant of CEO compensation in different ownership 
firms. The dependent variables in the five columns are CEO total compensation, bonus, salary plus bonus, 
option grants, and restricted stock grants plus stock option grants. SIZE is the book value of total assets in the 
beginning of the completion years. ROA is return on assets. RETURN is the completion year gross stock 
return. SALE_GROWTH is the growth rate of the sale. LEVERAGE is the total liability to total asset. CAR2 
is the announcement period cumulative abnormal return in (-1, 0). LTRETURN is 3-year market-adjusted 
monthly average stock return in (1, 36). TIME is the number of days to complete. DUM_DIVERSIFY 
identifies diversification in M&A. DUM_SHAREONLY is the indicator of 100% share financing in M&A. 
TENURE is the number of years when CEO works in the firms. DUM_CHAIRMAN indicates CEO duality. 
DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI are the indicators of 6%-10% and 10% plus institutional ownerships. 
LTRETURN_DUM06 and LTRETURN_DUM10 are the interactions of LTRETURN with DUM06_INSTI and 
DUM10_INSTI. ***, **, and * indicate respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
INTERCEPT -12197.000*** 
(-3.670)  
-1835.873*** 
(-3.390)  
-2527.735*** 
(-4.020)  
-5716.464** 
(-2.120)  
-7945.931*** 
(-2.680)  
SIZE 2123.027*** 
(8.360)  
351.963*** 
(8.520)  
504.469*** 
(10.510)  
1074.570*** 
(5.220)  
1403.833*** 
(6.190)  
ROA 2860.698 
(0.810)  
59.800 
(0.100)  
324.127 
(0.490)   
1365.635 
(0.480)  
2287.902 
(0.730)  
RETURN -164.001 
(-0.220)  
105.536 
(0.880)  
109.605 
(0.790)  
-917.435 
(-1.530)  
-471.671 
(-0.720)  
SALES_GROWTH -2.237 
(0.000)  
121.124 
(0.730)   
17.012 
(0.090)   
837.710 
(1.020)  
226.404 
(0.250)  
LEVERAGE -1084.092 
(-0.660)  
-54.759 
(-0.200)  
0.566 
(0.000)  
-937.962 
(-0.700)  
-1201.665 
(-0.820)  
CAR2 -2643.687 
(-0.570)  
148.484 
(0.200)  
266.419 
(0.300)   
-4006.057 
(-1.060)  
-2782.309 
(-0.670)  
LTRETURN -464.979 
(-0.390)  
-219.525 
(-1.130)  
-303.036 
(-1.340)  
61.556 
(0.060)  
-66.700 
(-0.060)  
TIME 331.277 
(1.480)  
58.952 
(1.620)  
70.308* 
(1.660)  
138.313 
(0.760)  
205.790 
(1.030)  
DUM_DIVERSIFY -602.565 
(-1.000)  
179.832* 
(1.840)  
172.211 
(1.520)  
-1007.103** 
(-2.070)  
-722.370 
(-1.350)  
DUM_SHAREONLY 2180.511* 
(1.920)  
297.830 
(1.610)  
338.147 
(1.570)  
1276.683 
(1.390)  
1775.193* 
(1.750)  
TENURE -350.416 
(-0.790)  
-59.309 
(-0.830)  
-33.245 
(-0.400)  
-296.909 
(-0.830)  
-425.247 
(-1.080)  
DUM_CHAIRMAN 183.198 
(0.290)  
175.033* 
(1.700)   
265.826** 
(2.220)  
282.542 
(0.550)  
-71.922 
(-0.130)  
DUM06_INSTI 60.831 
(0.070)  
-354.877*** 
(-2.590)  
-361.756** 
(-2.270)  
356.672 
(0.520)  
544.067 
(0.720)  
DUM10_INSTI -462.045 
(-0.560)  
-463.61*** 
(-3.450)  
-453.944*** 
(-2.910)  
37.192 
(0.060)  
195.107 
(0.260)  
LTRETURN_DUM06 726.534 
(0.570)  
291.817 
(1.410)  
361.180 
(1.500)  
51.873 
(0.050)  
239.076 
(0.210)  
LTRETURN_DUM10 46.697 
(0.040)  
232.296 
(1.110)  
293.334 
(1.200)  
-509.596 
(-0.490)  
-375.311 
(-0.330)  
YEAR & INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.3378 0.4208 0.5012 0.198 0.2194 
N 
253 253 253 253 253 
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Table 13 The regression of firm long-term post-acquisition performance on cumulated 
abnormal returns in Model 5.4 
This table includes all 268 events from non-family bidding firms from 2001 to 2005. It reveals whether the 
market reaction to the announcement of M&A is a good and unbiased predictor of the firm long term 
performance after M&A. LTRETURN is 3-year market-adjusted monthly average stock return in (1, 36). 
CAR2 is the announcement period cumulative abnormal return in (-1, 0). ME is the market value of the firm’s 
equity, which is the production of the market value of shares and the number of outstanding shares. BE/ME is 
the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of the equity. ***, **, and * indicate respectively 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 Variable LTRETURN LTRETURN LTRETURN 
INTERCEPT 0.104***  0.29 0.489 
  (-2.020) (0.660) (1.110) 
CAR2 -0.158 -0.194 -0.612 
  (-0.190) (-0.230) (-0.710) 
ME     0 
      (-0.720) 
BE/ME     -0.412***  
      (-2.630) 
YEAR & INDUSTRY NO YES YES 
R2-ADJUSTED -0.004 0.004 0.024 
PROB.F VALUE 0.851 0.383 0.145 
N 253 253 253 
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Table 14 The regression of CEO compensation in the completion year on managerial power 
in Model 5.5 
The regressions in this table include all 268 events from non-family bidding firms from 2001 to 2005. This 
table shows whether managerial powder is a determinant of CEO compensation in different ownership. The 
dependent variables in the five columns are CEO total compensation, bonus, salary plus bonus, option grants, 
and restricted stock grants plus stock option grants. SIZE is the book value of total assets in the beginning of 
the completion years. ROA is return on assets. RETURN is the completion year gross stock return. 
SALE_GROWTH is the growth rate of the sale. LEVERAGE is the total liability to total asset. CAR2 is the 
announcement period cumulative abnormal return in (-1, 0). LTRETURN is 3-year market-adjusted monthly 
average stock return in (1, 36). TIME is the number of days to complete. DUM_DIVERSIFY identifies 
diversification in M&A. DUM_SHAREONLY is the indicator of 100% share financing in M&A. TENURE is 
the number of years when CEO works in the firms. DUM_CHAIRMAN indicates CEO duality. 
DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI are the indicators of 6%-10% and 10% plus institutional ownerships. 
DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM06 and DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM10 are the interactions of DUM_CHAIRMAN 
with DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
INTERCEPT -12001.000*** 
(-3.510)  
-1971.579*** 
(-3.540)  
-2673.153*** 
(-4.130)   
-5198.305* 
(-1.880)  
-7717.947** 
(-2.530)  
SIZE 2143.490*** 
(8.410)  
352.083*** 
(8.470)  
505.192*** 
(10.460)  
1085.723*** 
(5.270)   
1421.937*** 
(6.250)  
ROA 2164.353 
(0.620)  
-8.250 
(-0.010)  
236.698 
(0.360)  
878.718 
(0.310)  
1722.731 
(0.550)  
RETURN -185.244 
(-0.250)  
85.940 
(0.710)  
86.678 
(0.620)  
-888.892 
(-1.490)  
-472.868 
(-0.720)   
SALES_GROWTH 65.436 
(0.060)  
130.715 
(0.790)  
27.682 
(0.140)  
839.102 
(1.020)  
301.141 
(0.330)  
LEVERAGE -1032.019 
(-0.630)  
-36.063 
(-0.130)  
18.336 
(0.060)  
-946.187 
(-0.710)  
-1131.523 
(-0.770)  
CAR2 -2649.754 
(-0.570)  
210.819 
(0.280)  
342.881 
(0.390)  
-4138.671 
(-1.100)  
-2890.032 
(-0.700)  
LTRETURN -88.517 
(-0.260)  
24.520 
(0.430)   
0.975 
(0.010)  
-109.672 
(-0.390)  
-115.798 
(-0.380)  
TIME 324.857 
(1.450)  
61.021* 
(1.670)  
72.713* 
(1.710)  
133.726 
(0.740)  
195.274 
(0.980)  
DUM_DIVERSIFY -625.634 
(-1.030)  
191.455* 
(1.930)  
184.920 
(1.600)  
-1091.063** 
(-2.210)  
-739.658 
(-1.360)  
DUM_SHAREONLY 2005.914* 
(1.750)  
301.872 
(1.620)  
339.752 
(1.570)  
1112.873 
(1.200)  
1618.042 
(1.590)  
TENURE -317.406 
(-0.720)  
-41.731 
(-0.580)  
-12.048 
(-0.140)   
-326.337 
(-0.910)  
-410.009 
(-1.040)  
DUM_CHAIRMAN -768.982 
(-0.530)  
324.457 
(1.370)   
417.159 
(1.510)   
-930.175 
(-0.790)  
-1005.793 
(-0.770)  
DUM06_INSTI -317.420 
(-0.230)  
-165.910 
(-0.730)  
-148.812 
(-0.560)  
-709.037 
(-0.630)  
112.896 
(0.090)  
DUM10_INSTI -1319.541 
(-0.970)  
-335.645 
(-1.520)  
-326.618 
(-1.270)   
-761.470 
(-0.690)  
-716.146 
(-0.590)  
DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM06 713.630 
(0.410)  
-241.731 
(-0.850)  
-266.590 
(-0.800)  
1675.892 
(1.180)  
704.306 
(0.450)  
DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM10 1370.112 
(0.810)  
-152.026 
(-0.550)  
-139.392 
(-0.440)   
1190.082 
(0.870)  
1366.218 
(0.910)  
YEAR & INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.3369 0.4175 0.4977 0.1995 0.2194 
N 
253 253 253 253 253 
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Table 15 The regression of the changes in CEO compensation structure in Model 5.6 
The regressions in this table include all 268 events from non-family bidding firms from 2001 to 2005. This 
table tests the determinants of the shifts of CEO compensation structure in M&A. Panel A uses multinomial 
logistic regressions while Panel B addresses the endogeneity by using two-stage regression, where the fitted 
long-term performance is from the first stage.The dependent variables are CASH and EQUITY which indicate 
the cash group and equity group respectively from our sample. SIZE is the book value of total assets in the 
beginning of the completion years. ROA is return on assets. RETURN is the completion year gross stock 
return. SALE_GROWTH is the growth rate of the sale. LEVERAGE is the total liability to total asset. CAR2 
is the announcement period cumulative abnormal return in (-1, 0). LTRETURN is 3-year market-adjusted 
monthly average stock return in (1, 36). LTRETURN_F is the fitted value from the first stage. TIME is the 
number of days to complete. DUM_DIVERSIFY identifies diversification in M&A. DUM_SHAREONLY is 
the indicator of 100% share financing in M&A. TENURE is the number of years when CEO works in the 
firms. DUM_CHAIRMAN indicates CEO duality. DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI are the indicators of 
6%-10% and 10% plus institutional ownerships. LTRETURN_CHAIR and LTRETURN_F_CHAIR are the 
interactions of LTRETURN and LTRETURN_F with DUM_CHAIRMAN. ***, **, and * indicate respectively 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Panel A Multinomial logistic regressions 
VARIABLE CASH EQUITY 
INTERCEPT 5.148*** 4.441*** 
(11.612) (8.519) 
SIZE -0.229 -0.478*** 
(2.335) (9.108) 
ROA -4.653** -1.431 
(3.964) (0.395) 
RETURN 0.162 0.233 
(0.122) (0.263) 
SALES_GROWTH -0.631 -0.262 
(0.919) (0.166) 
LEVERAGE -0.509 1.830* 
(0.229) (3.110) 
CAR2 5.378* 4.755 
(2.832) (2.312) 
LTRETURN 0.312 0.319 
(0.507) (0.530) 
TIME -0.023 0.006 
(0.028) (0.002) 
DUM_DIVERSIFY 0.065 -0.067 
(0.033) (0.035) 
DUM_SHAREONLY -0.460 0.484 
(0.395) (0.504) 
TENURE -1.147*** -0.794*** 
(16.899) (8.499) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN 0.652 0.324 
(2.702) (0.689) 
DUM06_INSTI -0.348 -0.346 
(0.459) (0.452) 
DUM10_INSTI -0.283 -0.263 
(0.313) (0.271) 
LTRETURN_CHAIR -0.266 -0.196 
(0.261) (0.143) 
YEAR YES YES 
N 253 253 
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Panel B Two-stage regressions 
VARIABLE CASH EQUITY 
INTERCEPT 5.179*** 4.626*** 
(11.353) (9.009) 
SIZE -0.214 -0.479*** 
(2.035) (9.078) 
ROA -4.552* -1.247 
(3.749) (0.294) 
RETURN 0.311 0.025 
(0.332) (0.003) 
SALES_GROWTH -0.591 -0.338 
(0.766) (0.262) 
LEVERAGE -0.317 1.424 
(0.076) (1.642) 
CAR2 4.417 5.107 
(1.927) (2.601) 
LTRETURN_F -1.616 0.941 
(1.485) (0.640) 
TIME -0.037 -0.007 
(0.072) (0.003) 
DUM_DIVERSIFY 0.084 -0.031 
(0.055) (0.008) 
DUM_SHAREONLY -0.485 0.542 
(0.413) (0.612) 
TENURE -1.203*** -0.713** 
(16.065) (6.292) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN 0.429 0.342 
(1.024) (0.629) 
DUM06_INSTI -0.315 -0.396 
(0.366) (0.583) 
DUM10_INSTI -0.276 -0.283 
(0.295) (0.311) 
LTRETURN_F _CHAIR 2.000 0.011 
(2.336) (0.000) 
YEAR YES YES 
N 253 253 
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Table 16 Robustness test of the regression of CEO compensation on LTRETURN_1 in 
Model 5.2, 5.3, 5.5, and 5.6 
The regressions in this table include all 268 events from non-family bidding firms from 2001 to 2005. This 
table uses a new proxy for firm long-term performance. The dependent variables in Panel A-D in the five 
columns are CEO total compensation, bonus, salary plus bonus, stock options, and restricted stocks plus stock 
options. In panel E, the dependent variable is TYPE, which equals to CASH, EQUITY, or NUETRAL, and 
NUETRAL is used as the base group in both regressions of CASH and EQUITY. LTRETURN_1 is 3-year 
market-adjusted monthly average stock return in (13, 48). TIME is the number of days to complete. 
LTRETURN_1_DUM06 and LTRETURN_1_DUM10 are the interactions of LTRETURN_1 with 
DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. LTRETURN_1_CHAIR is the interaction of LTRETURN_1 with 
DUM_CHAIRMAN.***, **, and * indicate respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Panel A. The regression of CEO compensation on LTRETURN_1 in Model 5.2 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
LTRETURN_1 105.984 
(0.310)  
-72.242 
(-1.310)  
-89.222 
(-1.390)  
166.060 
(0.600)  
161.430 
(0.530)  
      
Panel B The regression of CEO compensation on LTRETURN_1 in Model 5.3-A 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
LTRETURN_1 121.375 
(0.360)  
-67.880 
(-1.240)  
-84.110 
(-1.320)  
177.991 
(0.640)  
168.332 
(0.550)  
      
Panel C The regression of CEO compensation on LTRETURN_1 in Model 5.3-B 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
LTRETURN_1 366.020 
(0.560)  
-110.961 
(-1.040)  
-133.302 
(-1.070)  
488.302 
(0.910)  
590.125 
(1.010)  
LTRETURN_1_DUM06 -1021.878 
(-1.150)  
10.737 
(0.070)  
27.286 
(0.160)  
-804.275 
(-1.110)   
-1166.676 
(-1.470)  
LTRETURN_1_DUM10 125.280 
(0.150)  
82.207 
(0.600)  
82.847 
(0.520)  
-174.291 
(-0.260)  
-162.897 
(-0.220)  
 
Panel D The regression of CEO compensation on LTRETURN_1 in Model 5.5 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
LTRETURN_1 110.387 
(0.320)  
-74.814 
(-1.350)  
-92.120 
(-1.430)  
183.645 
(0.660)  
165.360 
(0.540)  
 
Panel E The multinomial logistic regression of CEO compensation on LTRETURN_1 in Model 5.6 
Variable CASH EQUITY 
LTRETURN_1 0.259 
(0.347) 
0.370 
(0.735) 
LTRETURN_1_CHAIR -0.553 
(1.167) 
-0.315 
(0.400) 
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Table 17 Robustness test of the regression of CEO compensation on HPR in Model 5.2 and 
5.3 
The regressions in this table include all 268 events from non-family bidding firms from 2001 to 2005. This 
table uses the 3-year market-adjusted monthly holding-period-return (HPR) and (HPR_1) in (1, 36) and (13, 
48) to measure firm long-term post-acquisition performance. Panel A is the summary statistics of the 
robustness proxies. The dependent variables in Panel B-E in the five columns are CEO total compensation, 
bonus, salary plus bonus, stock options, and restricted stocks plus stock options. HPR_DUM06 and 
HPR_DUM10 are the interactions of HPR with DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. HPR_1_DUM06 and 
HPR_DUM10 are the interactions of HPR_1 with DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. ***, **, and * indicate 
respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Panel A The comparison among different robustness proxies 
 N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
LTRETURN 263 -1.003 6.044 0.099*  0.824 
LTRETURN _1 257 -1.254 4.22 0.168***  0.842 
HPR 264 -1.051 4.218 0.071 0.763 
HPR_1 258 -1.119 3.802 0.159*** 0.820 
 
Panel B The regression of CEO compensation on HPR in Model 5.2 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
HPR -48.826 
(-0.130)  
27.262 
(0.450)  
0.819 
(0.010)  
-103.414 
(-0.340)  
-90.173 
(-0.270)  
      
Panel C The regression of CEO compensation on HPR in Model 5.3-B 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
HPR -431.684 
(-0.380)  
-177.984 
(-0.970)  
-247.613 
(-1.160)  
34.151 
(0.040)  
-108.609 
(-0.110)  
HPR_DUM06 700.920 
(0.570)  
251.536 
(1.250)  
305.084 
(1.310)  
42.430 
(0.040)   
258.443 
(0.230)  
HPR_DUM10 107.197 
(0.090)  
197.803 
(0.980)  
238.721 
(1.020)  
-370.977 
(-0.370)  
-248.680 
(-0.220)  
      
Panel D The regression of CEO compensation on HPR_1 in Model 5.2 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
HPR_1 50.454 
(0.140)  
-65.023 
(-1.140)  
-78.717 
(-1.190)  
113.321 
(0.400)  
89.662 
(0.280)  
      
Panel E The regression of CEO compensation on HPR_1 in Model 5.3-B 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
HPR_1 168.251 
(0.220)  
-110.754 
(-0.900)  
-131.020 
(-0.920)  
291.204 
(0.470)  
383.477 
(0.570)  
HPR_1_DUM06 -821.631 
(-0.870)  
27.252 
(0.180)  
41.134 
(0.230)  
-623.371 
(-0.810)  
-976.925 
(-1.150)  
HPR_1_DUM10 366.605 
(0.400)  
81.300 
(0.540)  
85.344 
(0.490)  
80.362 
(0.110)  
92.324 
(0.110)  
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Table 18 Robustness test of the regression including relative size of the transaction in 
Model 5.2, 5.3, and 5.5 
The regressions in this table include all 268 events from non-family bidding firms from 2001 to 2005. The 
relative size of the M&A transactions is incorporated. The dependendt variables are CEO total compensation, 
bonus, salary plus bonus, stock options, and restricted stocks plus stock options. PRCT_DEAL is the 
percentage of transaction value to the bidders’. DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI are the indicators of 6%-
10% and 10% plus institutional ownerships. CAR2 is the announcement period cumulative abnormal return in 
(-1, 0). DUM_CHAIRMAN indicates CEO duality. CAR2_DUM06 and CAR2_DUM10 are the interactions of 
CAR2 with DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. LTRETURN is 3-year market-adjusted monthly average 
stock return in (1, 36). LTRETURN_DUM06 and LTRETURN_DUM10 are the interactions of LTRETURN 
with DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM06 and DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM10 
are the interactions of DUM_CHAIRMAN with DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. ***, **, and * indicate 
respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Panel A The regression of CEO compensation with relative size of transaction in Model 5.2 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
PRCT_DEAL 790.130 299.832** 344.845** 89.831 470.510 
(1.000) (2.360) (2.330) (0.140) (0.670) 
DUM06_INSTI 157.026 -314.990** -312.766** 360.398 576.296 
(0.190) (-2.360) (-2.010) (0.540) (0.780) 
DUM10_INSTI -445.447 -437.858*** -421.025*** -7.293 162.026 
(-0.550) (-3.350) (-2.770) (-0.010) (0.220) 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.341 0.432 0.510 0.198 0.221 
 
Panel B The regression of CEO compensation with relative size of transaction in Model 5.3-A 
 TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
CAR2 -13552.000 -2792.512* -3193.382 -13503.000 -7500.698 
(-1.290) (-1.660) (-1.630) (-1.580) (-0.800) 
PRCT_DEAL 686.593 275.340** 315.830** -1.440 423.426 
(0.860) (2.170) (2.140) (0.000) (0.600) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN 59.404 149.811 236.262** 207.359 -158.408 
(0.090) (1.480) (2.010) (0.400) (-0.280) 
DUM06_INSTI 226.619 -295.701** -290.075* 417.896 606.515 
(0.270) (-2.220) (-1.870) (0.620) (0.810) 
DUM10_INSTI -375.065 -419.750*** -399.656*** 52.763 193.295 
(-0.460) (-3.230) (-2.640) (0.080) (0.270) 
CAR2_DUM06 13770.000 4775.053** 5571.523** 10071.000 5494.268 
(1.000) (2.170) (2.180) (0.900) (0.450) 
CAR2_DUM10 14036.000 3510.131* 4147.664* 12114.000 6286.765 
(1.180) (1.840) (1.870) (1.250) (0.590) 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.339 0.440 0.517 0.197 0.216 
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Panel C The regression of CEO compensation with relative size of transaction in Model 5.3-B 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
LTRETURN -420.482 -203.619 -284.786 68.990 -38.889 
(-0.350) (-1.060) (-1.270) (0.070) (-0.040) 
PRCT_DEAL 835.377 298.616** 342.634** 139.575 522.105 
(1.050) (2.340) (2.310) (0.220) (0.740) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN 154.292 164.700 253.970** 277.712 -89.988 
(0.240) (1.610) (2.140) (0.540) (-0.160) 
DUM06_INSTI 79.004 -348.381** -354.302** 359.708 555.425 
(0.090) (-2.560) (-2.240) (0.520) (0.740) 
DUM10_INSTI -469.847 -466.400*** -457.144*** 35.889 190.231 
(-0.570) (-3.510) (-2.960) (0.050) (0.260) 
LTRETURN_DUM06 690.356 278.884 346.341 45.829 216.465 
(0.540) (1.360) (1.450) (0.040) (0.190) 
LTRETURN_DUM10 -41.517 200.763 257.152 -524.335 -430.444 
(-0.030) (0.960) (1.060) (-0.500) (-0.370) 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.338 0.432 0.511 0.195 0.218 
 
Panel D The regression of CEO compensation with relative size of transaction in Model 5.5 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
PRCT_DEAL 780.314 298.428** 342.841** 98.916 460.363 
(0.990) (2.340) (2.310) (0.150) (0.650) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN -801.969 311.842 402.666 -934.357 -1025.255 
(-0.550) (1.330) (1.470) (-0.790) (-0.790) 
DUM06_INSTI -318.262 -166.232 -149.182 -709.143 112.400 
(-0.230) (-0.740) (-0.570) (-0.630) (0.090) 
DUM10_INSTI -1326.639 -338.359 -329.737 -762.370 -720.334 
(-0.980) (-1.540) (-1.290) (-0.690) (-0.590) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM06 734.945 -233.579 -257.225 1678.594 716.881 
(0.420) (-0.830) (-0.780) (1.180) (0.460) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM10 1357.351 -156.907 -144.998 1188.464 1358.689 
(0.810) (-0.580) (-0.460) (0.870) (0.900) 
YEAR & INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.337 0.429 0.507 0.196 0.217 
N 253 253 253 253 253 
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Table 19 Changing institutional ownership cutoff percentage from 6%-10% to 5%-10% in 
Model 5.2, 5.3, and 5.5 
The regressions in this table include all 268 events from non-family bidding firms from 2001 to 2005. The 5% 
institutional ownership is used to distinguish widely held firms and institution controlled firms. The 
dependendt variables are CEO total compensation, bonus, salary plus bonus, stock options, and restricted 
stocks plus stock options. PRCT_DEAL is the percentage of transaction value to the bidders’. DUM05_INSTI 
and DUM10_INSTI are the indicators of 5%-10% and 10% plus institutional ownerships. CAR2 is the 
announcement period cumulative abnormal return in (-1, 0). DUM_CHAIRMAN indicates CEO duality. 
CAR2_DUM05 and CAR2_DUM10 are the interactions of CAR2 with DUM05_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. 
LTRETURN is 3-year market-adjusted monthly average stock return in (1, 36). LTRETURN_DUM05 and 
LTRETURN_DUM10 are the interactions of LTRETURN with DUM05_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. 
DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM05 and DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM10 are the interactions of DUM_CHAIRMAN 
with DUM05_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. ***, **, and * indicate respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels. 
 
Panel A  The regression of CEO compensation with 5% to 10% and 10% plus institutional ownerships in Model 5.2 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
DUM05_INSTI 989.504 -528.160*** -550.577*** 1439.010 1926.228 
(0.900) (-2.970) (-2.660) (1.630) (1.980) 
DUM10_INSTI 321.044 -660.176*** -662.815*** 980.198 1428.382 
(0.290) (-3.720) (-3.210) (1.110) (1.470) 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.343 0.429 0.507 0.210 0.234 
 
Panel B The regression of CEO compensation with 5% to 10% and 10% plus institutional ownerships in Model 5.3-A 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
CAR2 
-13201.000 -5906.952** -7190.205** -5202.174 -1326.593 
(-0.820) (-2.290) (-2.400) (-0.400) (-0.090) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN 
72.308 178.562* 270.421** 167.335 -195.521 
(0.110) (1.770) (2.300) (0.330) (-0.350) 
DUM05_INSTI 
1177.181 -407.854** -402.878* 1439.581 1877.855* 
(1.030) (-2.240) (-1.900) (1.570) (1.860) 
DUM10_INSTI 
516.350 -536.055*** -510.431** 982.753 1379.846 
(0.450) (-2.940) (-2.410) (1.070) (1.360) 
CAR2_DUM05 
7185.352 6959.073** 8540.929*** -4269.159 -5799.084 
(0.410) (2.450) (2.590) (-0.300) (-0.370) 
CAR2_DUM10 
13565.000 6593.177** 8096.769** 3874.915 30.107 
(0.800) (2.430) (2.570) (0.280) (0.000) 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.340 0.440 0.518 0.207 0.229 
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Panel C The regression of CEO compensation with 5% to 10% and 10% plus institutional ownerships in Model 5.3-B 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
LTRETURN -1226.724 -1031.358** -1385.321*** -110.358 564.372 
(-0.450) (-2.370) (-2.750) (-0.050) (0.230) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN 123.367 159.492 245.842** 247.999 -111.772 
(0.190) (1.570) (2.090) (0.490) (-0.200) 
DUM05_INSTI 721.379 -757.076*** -851.196*** 1423.448 2050.010 
(0.580) (-3.800) (-3.690) (1.420) (1.860) 
DUM10_INSTI 91.312 -893.058*** -968.932*** 1007.064 1599.968 
(0.070) (-4.450) (-4.170) (1.000) (1.440) 
LTRETURN_DUM05 1458.796 1088.871** 1428.703*** 255.995 -394.190 
(0.530) (2.460) (2.790) (0.120) (-0.160) 
LTRETURN_DUM10 816.380 1052.276** 1384.680*** -341.303 -1010.481 
(0.300) (2.370) (2.690) (-0.150) (-0.410) 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.340 0.439 0.519 0.207 0.231 
 
Panel D The regression of CEO compensation with 5% to 10% and 10% plus institutional ownerships in Model 5.5 
Variable TOTAL BONUS SALARY_BONUS OPTION STOCK_OPTION 
DUM_CHAIRMAN -830.710 374.476 463.942 -125.193 -770.233 
(-0.380) (1.070) (1.140) (-0.070) (-0.400) 
DUM05_INSTI 560.186 -372.083 -386.349 1194.065 1709.818 
(0.310) (-1.280) (-1.140) (0.820) (1.070) 
DUM10_INSTI -581.419 -553.651* -569.795* 805.971 733.694 
(-0.320) (-1.880) (-1.660) (0.550) (0.450) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM05 637.623 -258.616 -274.431 405.015 292.396 
(0.270) (-0.690) (-0.630) (0.220) (0.140) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM10 1365.116 -179.758 -161.904 292.179 1030.672 
(0.600) (-0.480) (-0.370) (0.160) (0.510) 
YEAR & INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.339 0.425 0.504 0.203 0.230 
N 253 253 253 253 253 
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Table 20 Analysis of changes in CEO compensation as opposed to the level of compensation 
using Models 5.2, 5.3, and 5.5 
The regressions in this table include all 268 events from non-family bidding firms from 2001 to 2005. The 
dependendt variables are the differences of CEO total compensation, bonus, salary plus bonus, stock options, 
and restricted stocks plus stock options between completion years and one year prior. PRCT_DEAL is the 
percentage of transaction value to the bidders’. DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI are the indicators of 6%-
10% and 10% plus institutional ownerships. CAR2 is the announcement period cumulative abnormal return in 
(-1, 0). DUM_CHAIRMAN indicates CEO duality. CAR2_DUM06 and CAR2_DUM10 are the interactions of 
CAR2 with DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. LTRETURN is 3-year market-adjusted monthly average 
stock return in (1, 36). LTRETURN_DUM06 and LTRETURN_DUM10 are the interactions of LTRETURN 
with DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM06 and DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM10 
are the interactions of DUM_CHAIRMAN with DUM06_INSTI and DUM10_INSTI. ***, **, and * indicate 
respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Panle A The regression of the changes in CEO compensation in Model 5.2 
Variable  TOTAL  BONUS  SALARY_BONUS  OPTION  STOCK_OPTION 
DUM06_INSTI 2078.414 -238.713** -236.656* 1899.734 2343.599 
(1.500) (-2.000) (-1.960) (1.570) (1.740) 
DUM10_INSTI 1218.583 -452.096*** -441.733*** 1488.711 1749.679 
(0.900) (-3.880) (-3.740) (1.260) (1.330) 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.031 0.213 0.211 0.023 0.032 
P-VALUE of F-TEST 0.153 <.0001 <.0001 0.212 0.148 
 
Panel B The regression of the changes in CEO compensation in Model 5.3-A 
Variable  TOTAL  BONUS  SALARY_BONUS  OPTION  STOCK_OPTION 
CAR2 50100.000*** -3292.548** -3120.304** 44376.000*** 53353.000*** 
(2.910) (-2.230) (-2.080) (2.970) (3.200) 
LTRETURN -579.293 66.125 53.414 -840.146* -659.405 
(-1.020) (1.350) (1.080) (-1.700) (-1.200) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN 1416.319 97.434 89.223 1400.461 1455.716 
(1.360) (1.090) (0.980) (1.550) (1.440) 
DUM06_INSTI 1836.803 -221.862* -219.919* 1664.136 2086.303 
(1.340) (-1.880) (-1.840) (1.390) (1.570) 
DUM10_INSTI 984.072 -438.424*** -428.240*** 1256.461 1501.008 
(0.730) (-3.800) (-3.660) (1.080) (1.150) 
CAR2_DUM06 -44370.000* 5181.980*** 5214.624*** -40485.000** -48078.000** 
(-1.950) (2.660) (2.640) (-2.060) (-2.190) 
CAR2_DUM10 -48469.000** 2592.591 2549.527 -48313.000*** -51304.000*** 
(-2.470) (1.540) (1.490) (-2.840) (-2.700) 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.049 0.230 0.228 0.049 0.055 
P-VALUE of F-TEST 0.069 <.0001 <.0001 0.069 0.050 
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Panel C The regression of the changes in CEO compensation in Model 5.3-B 
Variable  TOTAL  BONUS  SALARY_BONUS  OPTION  STOCK_OPTION 
LTRETURN -1353.785 46.077 25.270 -1387.703 -1595.245 
(-0.680) (0.270) (0.140) (-0.800) (-0.820) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN 88.590 -59.947 -70.448 -113.633 4.632 
(0.120) (-0.940) (-1.090) (-0.180) (0.010) 
DUM06_INSTI 2006.948 -244.237** -244.774** 1878.358 2257.075 
(1.420) (-2.010) (-1.990) (1.530) (1.650) 
DUM10_INSTI 1087.371 -452.921*** -442.654*** 1374.589 1592.129 
(0.790) (-3.800) (-3.670) (1.140) (1.190) 
LTRETURN_DUM06 545.791 49.036 72.264 108.242 661.746 
(0.260) (0.270) (0.390) (0.060) (0.320) 
LTRETURN_DUM10 1251.389 -12.562 -21.870 1252.539 1499.721 
(0.580) (-0.070) (-0.120) (0.670) (0.710) 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.024 0.207 0.207 0.020 0.026 
P-VALUE of F-TEST 0.210 <.0001 <.0001 0.247 0.194 
 
Panel D The regression of the changes in CEO compensation in Model 5.5 
Variable  TOTAL  BONUS  SALARY_BONUS  OPTION  STOCK_OPTION 
DUM_CHAIRMAN 5096.036** 326.001 348.592 3968.559* 5153.998** 
(2.100) (1.560) (1.640) (1.880) (2.190) 
DUM06_INSTI 4568.529** -77.477 -30.834 3257.061 4847.323** 
(1.980) (-0.390) (-0.150) (1.620) (2.160) 
DUM10_INSTI 4562.508** -261.090 -245.261 4219.921** 5114.881** 
(2.020) (-1.340) (-1.240) (2.150) (2.330) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM06 -3876.647 -251.512 -321.985 -2095.393 -3897.776 
(-1.330) (-1.000) (-1.260) (-0.830) (-1.380) 
DUM_CHAIRMAN_DUM10 -5176.566* -296.431 -306.477 -4201.592* -5209.416* 
(-1.850) (-1.230) (-1.250) (-1.720) (-1.920) 
YEAR & INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES 
R2-ADJUSTED 0.037 0.211 0.210 0.029 0.039 
P-VALUE of F-TEST 0.125 <.0001 <.0001 0.176 0.114 
N 253 253 253 253 253 
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 Figure 1 The proportion of each components of CEO compensation in M&A year 
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